Sarah Collman (will
not be taking 2nd module)
Title
Network Analysis for Conflict Prevention: Examining
Ex-Combatant Networks and Political Actor Influencers in Burundi
Background
After gaining independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi
experienced several waves of violence and mass killing between two ethnic
groups, Hutus and Tutsis. Prior to the civil war, the two most extreme events
occurred in 1972 and 1993. In 1972, Tutsis were systematically targeted by
Hutus, which led to massive reprisal attacks on Hutus (estimated 100,000
killed). Subsequently in 1993, following the first democratic election of a
Hutu-led government, Tutsis assassinated Ndadaye, the leader of the Hutu
government. This in turn spurred mass killing of Tutsis by Hutus. It is
estimated that 250,000 people died between 1972 and 1993.
In April 1994, a plane carrying the Hutu president of
Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and Juvenal Habyarimana, president of Rwanda, was
shot down. For the next 11 years, Burundi spiraled into a bloody civil war, in
which Hutu rebel groups fought the Tutsi-dominated national army. The two
prominent rebel groups, which eventually formed political parties once a peace
agreement was reached in 2005, National Council for the Defense of Democracy –
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the National Forces of
Liberation (FNL).
Although the war officially ended in 2005, even though the
FNL did not sign the peace agreement until 2009, Burundi has experienced a
fragile peace that has been colored by political violence (surrounding the 2010
election), a tightening of the government’s grip on power, and continuing
ethnic tensions. In the lead up to the last election, the ruling CNDD-FDD’s
youth wing, the Imbonerakure, allegedly committed political violence, which
spurred reprisal attacks. Due to its violent past, Burundi has the potential
for further conflict ahead of and during the upcoming June 2015 election.
Primary Questions
In Burundi’s transition from civil war to a post-conflict
state, were connections and networks of armed group ex-combatants maintained
and do they remain strong today?
Are there certain political figures that have
the capacity to influence members through these underlying networks?
In
addition to networks within armed groups (or among ex-combatants in former
armed groups), is the CNDD-FDD in Burundi connected to any of the more than
fifty armed groups in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo?
If so, can
an analysis of these networks be useful in a conflict prevention approach leading
up to the June 2015 election?
Hypothesis
If underlying networks from armed groups during the civil war
exist, political actors with influence may be able to recruit ex-combatants to
join the CNDD-FDD and the associated youth wing, which is alleged to have
committed political violence during the last election in 2010.
Data
Obtaining credible and easily accessible data for this
project may be an obstacle. The currently sensitive nature of the conflict
could prove difficult for data collection. Ways to obtain information about
networks of armed group ex-combatants include interviews, surveys, and
observation of communication patterns. In order to identify powerful political
actors and levels of influence, a stakeholder analysis must be conducted. It
would be useful to gather two sets of data: one set to gauge networks and
connections of armed group networks during the war (around 2000 or so) and the
other set in present day. It would be interesting to track how the networks
changed and identify underlying networks that have been maintained in the
transition from ongoing conflict to a post-conflict state.
In assessing the data, important measures to consider
include subgroups to identify factions, and centrality measures such as
in-degree and betweenness. Identifying key people that act as silos to other
groups will be important to assess power and influence. A consideration of the
attribute data may be interesting to determine who the ex-combatants are and
what similarities they have in common with those they are connected to. This
information will be useful in terms of conflict prevention, in order to
identify certain groups to target.
Conclusions
Social network analysis can help map the network and
connections between ex-combatants from the civil war and former rebel leaders
that now hold positions in the government now. Conducting a stakeholder
analysis and gaining insight into power and influence may be useful in
predicting mobilization techniques for future violence. While obtaining data
may be somewhat of a challenge, understanding the networks that have been
maintained since the end of the civil war may prove to be useful in terms of
conflict prevention.
Sources
·
Insight on Conflict, Burundi Conflict Profile, March 2014
·
International Crisis Group, Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections, February 2010
·
Human Rights Watch, We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You, May 2010
·
IRIN, Analysis:
Upcoming polls to test Burundi’s fragile peace, November 2009