Topic: Using Social Network Analysis to Study the Network of Illicit Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Africa

[I am not taking the second module]

Background

The widespread proliferation and availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are key facilitators of armed violence and conflict and continue to pose a systemic and ubiquitous threat to the long-term social and economic development of countries, particularly small developing states. The high volumes of trade of SALW pose a significant threat to international peace and security. The proliferation of low-intensity conflicts around world are the root cause for the global increase in demand and consequent flow of SALW.

Africa in particular has become an area of high demand and illicit transfers of SALW, due to porous border, and prevalent armed conflict, violence and organized crime in the region. It is estimated that “out of 640 million circulating globally, 100 million are found in Africa of which about 30 million are found in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa.  The majority of these SALW (around 59%) are in the hands of civilians, 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police and 0.2% by armed groups.”[1] This influx of small arms and light weapons has hampered the socio-economic development of African nations, and has resulted in the rise of transnational criminal violence, terrorist campaigns, gender-based violence and most importantly protracted conflicts in the region, notably South Sudan’s civil war.[2]

While a large share of arms trafficking appears to be carried out by private entities, certain Governments also contribute to the illicit trade by providing arms to proxy groups fighting against enemy governments, terrorist organizations and other non-state armed groups with similar ideological and political agendas. These types of arms transfers are prevalent in Africa where conflict is common. For instance, in recent years, the Small Arms Surveys have revealed that governments have delivered SALW to various armed groups in Somalia. Similarly, the Sudan Government’s stockpiles are major sources of supply of SALW to non-state armed groups both through deliberate arming and battlefield capture.[3] 

According to Small Arms Survey’s definition, small arms include revolvers, pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine-guns. Light weapons comprise heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS); and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm, single-rail-launched rockets and 120 mm mortars as long as they can be transported and operated as intended by a light vehicle.[4]

Research Questions

The objective of the study is to conduct a preliminary examination of the structure of the illicit arms flows into, out of and within Africa, and to identify the central actors within the network. Social network analysis methods will be used to demonstrate the supply chain and relational characteristics between the individual actors within the network to reveal vulnerabilities within the supply chain that enable the illicit transfer of SALW.  Such a network analysis can be used to add another dimension and support findings of a larger qualitative analysis of the SALW transfer and proliferation network in Africa.

Data collection and Methodology

SALW Data

This study will rely on the SALW transfer database and case studies maintained by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT)[5], located at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. In addition to quantitative data regarding legal SALW transfers, NISAT also maintains a Black Market File Archive[6] which includes a collection of investigative reports and news stories on cases of illicit arms trade. Some of these reports contain detailed accounts of illicit arms transfer including the manufacturer, purchaser, intermediate dealers, brokers and shipping agents. This information can be coded for the purpose of social network analysis.

Other source of data includes the Small Arms Survey conducted by the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. The Survey conducts an annual analysis of various aspects of the both the legal and illicit SALW trade including in-depth country-based analysis. Some of the tools maintained by the Small Arms Survey that are useful data resources include the Weapons ID Database, Publications for each African country, Small Arms Survey Yearbook and the Transparency Barometer.[7]

Hypothesis and Methodology

Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a tool that facilitates better understanding and identification of patterns in a dataset by enabling the visualizations of important connections in a network.  SNA methods are applied under the assumption that a group of actors that are being studied constitute a network. In proliferation networks, the most notable actors include buyers and sellers, brokers, insurance and financial agents, government licensing and export officials, and transportation agents and aircraft operators.[8]

Illicit networks for the transfer of small arms and light weapons exhibit more decentralized structures because such weapons are not difficult to manufacture, and therefore there is abundant surplus and the distribution is not closely regulated. These networks are more diffused than others, number of actors in these networks is far greater and their location is distributed in far more states. Therefore, more sub-groups in the form of cliques are likely to emerge in which nodes are directly connected to each other than indirectly through hubs. However, when the analysis is conducted on the State level, some state locales are more active as organizations and destinations, transit and trans-shipment points of illicit SALW.[9] For example, in the SALW supply chain to conflict zones in Africa, Eastern European sates emerge as central nodes and therefore are important geographic hubs in an otherwise dense global network of SALW trade.[10]

The NISAT and Small Arms Survey data can be used to construct a one mode directed network within which the nodes will represent state locales i.e. geographic spaces from which, to which, or through which illicit SALW shipments have moved. The lines connecting the nodes i.e. the ties will represent the incidents of illicit arms-transfers. If the lines are thicker i.e. the ties are stronger if more illicit arms transfer events occurred between the two nodes geographic locales). The ties between the nodes will be directed in the sense that it represents the flow of SALW from one State locale to the other. Since in a network some nodes/actors are more prominent that the other with respect to the number and types of social ties they maintain with other nodes, centrality measures such as In-Degree and Out-Degree, closeness and betweenness can be used to identify the key suppliers, African importing locales, middlemen etc.

·      In-Degree: The number of State locales from which of SALW to a State locale has been shipped

·      Out-Degree: The number of other State locales that were recipient of a State’s SALW exports.

·      Betweenness: This measure can be used to identify the brokers, high stress points and hubs within the network as this centrality measure the state locales that are on the most paths between other state locales.

·      Closeness:  State locales that are connected to many others through short distance paths. This centrality measures will be useful to identify the mobilizers in the network.

Additionally, for African States, where more data regarding detailed-accounts of illicit arms transactions are available, separate two-mode network maps can be created wherein the nodes can be the actors involved in these transactions and maybe connected through affiliations with the same organization or events. With such detailed and well-developed illicit arms transfer datasets, attribute data can also be developed including nationality and role (supplier, broker, financer, transportation agent, government official).[11]  Such a network analysis would be more useful to study the SALW illicit transfer network in Africa, therefore a more detailed and robust illicit arms trafficking dataset will need to be built with the help of NISAT black market archive and other investigative news sources.[12]

Limitations

Quality of data is fundamental for the utility of any SNA. While information on the legal-interstate trade of conventional arms is well developed, data regarding the transfer of SALW is limited, incomplete, sometimes distorted and often subjected to selection bias as transfers of such weapons are regulated and restricted by law and policy. Consequently, the central actors of the supply chain of SALW include clandestine networks of individuals and organizational actors, and therefore it is difficult to trace the networks through which illicit flows of small arms take place and identify the central actors that facilitate the illicit transfers. Furthermore, due to the lack of data, it is a big challenge to have complete information about the nodes and the links between them, and identify characteristics and central features of these networks which are particularly important when the aim is to model network vulnerabilities.[13]  

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[1] Africa: The Influx of Small Arms, Light Weapons." AllAfrica.com. February 22, 2018. Accessed October 22, 2018. https://allafrica.com/stories/201802220192.html.

[2] Bowler, Tim. "Which Country Dominates the Global Arms Trade?" BBC News. May 10, 2018. Accessed October 22, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43873518.

[3] "Illicit Trafficking." Small Arms Survey - . February 22, 2018. Accessed October 22, 2018. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html.

[4] "Definitions." Small Arms Survey - Definitions. April 15, 2013. Accessed October 22, 2018. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html.

[5] Peace Pesearch Institute Oslo PRIO. NISAT - Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers. Accessed October 22, 2018. http://nisat.prio.org/Trade-Database/.

[6] Peace Pesearch Institute Oslo PRIO. NISAT - Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers. Accessed October 22, 2018. http://nisat.prio.org/Document-Library/Theme/.

[7] "Mission." Small Arms Survey - Mission. August 29, 2018. Accessed October 22, 2018. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/mission.html.

[8] Curwen, Philip A. 2007. “The Social Networks of Small Arms Proliferation: Mapping an

Aviation Enabled Supply Chain.” Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.

[9] Kinsella, David, and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2016. "Arms Supply and Proliferation Networks." Oxford Handbooks Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190228217.013.33.

[10] Kinsella, David. 2014. “Illicit Arms Transfers to Africa and the Prominence of the Former Soviet Bloc: A Social Network Analysis.” Crime, Law and Social Change, August, 1–25. doi:10.1007/s10611-014-9531-9.

[11] Curwen, Philip A. 2007. “The Social Networks of Small Arms Proliferation: Mapping an

Aviation Enabled Supply Chain.” Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.

[12] Kinsella, David 2006. “The Black Market in Small Arms: Examining a Social Network.” Contemporary Security Policy 27 (1): 100–117. doi:10.1080/13523260600603105.

[13] Kinsella, David, and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2016. "Arms Supply and Proliferation Networks." Oxford Handbooks Online,  doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190228217.013.33.