Mapping Social Movements and Political Parties in Egypt

Introduction

Much has been written about the proliferation of political parties in post-Mubarak Egypt, particularly in light of parliamentary elections scheduled for November 28. The role of networks in determining the success of social movements (and similarly oriented forms of social protest) has been described and discussed extensively. But can revolutionaries govern as effectively as they mobilize and organize? When called to govern by their supporters, what are the determinants of success?

Background

This summer, I had the chance to visit Egypt and research political party development and infrastructure following Mubarak's ouster. While there, I met with party officials, former members of Parliament, and other activists. I was particularly interested in party organization--how parties elected their leadership, how they recruited and trained candidates, and how they developed their messages. Most of this was new to the people I interviewed. They were quickly able to explain what they didn't want, but they didn't really have a well-constructed vision of the future.

I also discovered that the success of the Revolution was determined in large part by social networks. One activist went so far as to say that the Revolutionary Youth Coalition actually had no political power--save the ability to pack Tahrir Square with protestors with a day's notice. That being said, the Revolution was successful because individuals developed networks that became increasingly impenetrable: they could recruit, communicate, and attract supporters with less fear over time.

Methodology

Let us start with a relatively straightforward research question: how can networks involved in social protest change to adapt to the challenge of governance? SNA can certainly help us find an answer, but the solution might not necessarily lie in extensively mapping individual networks and a knowledge of who people are talking to, and how. The determinants of electoral success are certainly network-oriented, but we're trying to understand how, specifically, a network must adapt given changes to its environment. I would propose the following comparative method.

First, map two networks. The first network should be that of a protest movement--in this case, the Revolutionary Youth Council or the April 6 Movement. Then, map the network of a more organized, established political party. In this case, we might look at Al Wafd--one of Egypt's oldest political parties with an established organizational structure.

Then, compare each network's properties:

1. How does each network conceive of centrality? What's the right mix of centralization/decentralization?

2. In which direction does information/action flow?

3. Do bridges evolve geographically? Functionally? Where are they located? What are the barriers to entry to small clusters?

4. Measure closeness--protestors probably shouldn't be too close to their leaders, but that might not work for a party organization.

5. Reach--does everyone know how the party is faring in different districts/governorates? Can resources be allocated quickly and efficiently?

6. Measure cohesion--perhaps a lack of cohesion degrades a party's message.

All of these factors and properties are important, and will likely allow us to paint a picture of success for nascent parties. The determinants of network success in protest movements differs from that of parties, but there's reason to believe that macro-adjustments to these networks enhance their chances for success.

Conclusions

In this case, I want to again emphasize that while knowledge of the network is important and relevant, this analysis is comparative. We did not talk at length in class about comparative network analyses, but I think a study like this would be timely. In societies like Egypt, we often see the same ancien regime officials emerge and claim power in times of change--largely because they understand electoral success and they have developed structures to perpetuate it. Protest movements might fair just as well if they knew how best to transform their networks when political space is created.

Knowledge Network Analysis of DC-Area National Security Think Tanks to Inform Foundational Grantmaking Strategy

I spent this summer interning at a foundation in DC, Ploughshares Fund, that does all of its grantmaking in the nuclear weapons / nonproliferation / disarmament / terrorism sphere. Of the handful of foundations engaged in this space, Ploughshares Fund has one of the largest footprints, measured both in endowment size and "bang for the buck" -- the caliber of projects being completed by Ploughshares-backed organizations.

For me, it was fascinating to sit on a perch, so to speak, and see what kinds of interesting and exciting projects our grantees were pursuing with the money we provided them. It also led me to realize the strength of the network that Ploughshares is able to build through its grantmaking. Behold the power of money! Whether working on advocacy campaigns around the national budget or identifying key experts to put together a panel on Iran's nuclear program or Pakistan's accelerated nuclear weapons buildup, the network of think tanks and experts that are funded by Ploughshares could be summoned, often on very short notice, to put together reports, briefings, talking points, and more.

Over the course of the summer, I also noticed that while the think tank community in DC is tremendous, and while the security and defense community within that circle is still fairly large, and even while the nuclear-focused group within THAT is still sizable, the same names and personalities started popping up.

So I've been thinking about the relationships Ploughshares Fund maintains with nuclear-focused experts, both at the individual level and at the institutional level. What I'd like to do, therefore, is develop a knowledge analysis of the DC-area nuclear-focused community by constructing an ego network around Ploughshares Fund. This exercise will help me see not only who the foundation's most frequent individual collaborators are (on presentations, panels, Congressional hearings, books, articles, manuscripts, media appearances, etc.), but also what relationships are strongest between Ploughshares Fund and other institutions, regardless of whether they are actually funded by Ploughshares. That is, what organizations (think tanks, academic research centers, grassroots / advocacy organizations, etc.) come to the forefront in terms of working closely with the foundation?

Answering this question would be crucial to identifying the fields in which Ploughshares could reassess its funding strategy for upcoming fiscal years. From the data gathered and inferences made from the ego network as described above, one could determine those individuals and organizations that collaborate most frequently with Ploughshares Fund. More importantly, the network analysis would help isolate individuals and organizations that currently do not receive funding from Ploughshares.

This creates space to determine what grantees should be funded by Ploughshares in upcoming grantmamking cycles. After all, grantmaking is a two-way street -- while organizations can submit a grant proposal for Ploughshares to consider, the foundation can also take an active approach to grantmaking by aggressively identifying and courting potential grantees.

This network analysis would have the additional benefit of identifying those organizations and individuals that are currently funded by Ploughshares and yet are not close collaborators on projects and campaigns. This insight can assist Ploughshares in deciding which grants should be renewed for the following fiscal year and which should be terminated.

Using network analysis tools to determine a foundation's current and future grantmaking mix would be a novel departure from the current funding process, which does rely on connections amongst individuals and organizations to identify reliable experts, but in a less formal and structured way. As a result, grantmaking in the DC-area security community can be rather hit-or-miss, with some grantees doing amazing things and others remaining fairly static.

Money is a powerful motivator, but I find true effort and brilliant work comes only when strong relationships are built amongst individuals and groups that share not only common goals, but the same level of drive and ambition to achieve those objectives. The knowledge network analysis proposed above would help create those synergies in a more efficient and proactive manner.

Social Networks and Human Terrain

Social Networks and Human Terrain Analysis

http://www.geospatial-intelligence-forum.com/mgt-home/107-mgt-2009-volume-7-issue-2/930-mapping-the-human-terrain.html

Background

Human Terrain analyses has become a new buzz word in the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense. Human Terrain analyses is the fusion of socio-cultural attributes and relationships depicted in a geospatial format. Since the the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan began, there has been a much greater emphasis on understanding tribes, clans, and various ethnic groups in these war torn countries and their relationship to the ongoing insurgencies.

Area of Interest

I have previously studied al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb( AQIM) and the Sahelian nomadic tribes in Mali, Algeria, and Niger and I believe gaining a better understanding of the social networks, culture, and grievances among the Tuareg and Berber populations would provide a greater understanding of why certain members of these groups support terrorist/criminal networks in the Sahel and Sahara such as AQIM.

Methodology/Key Questions

-Interview and geo-locate the most influential tribes and clans among the Tuareg and Berbers
-Identify their seasonal nomadic and pastoral patterns
-Find out what communication devices are the most prevalent (Radio, Phone, Internet)
-Are connections strong outside their respective ethnic groups
-Identify key leaders and prominent members of each tribe, clan, family and map out their relations to other members of the tribe
-Try to identfy strengths of relationships by the frequency of contact.
-Gather census data from the tribes in order to discern the size and scope
-Identify grievances that would faciliate certain tribes joining sides with AQIM and smugglers

Conclusion

The finished analysis would be be a two part product: one product would consist of the nomadic tribes mapped seasonally to identify the likely locations of these groups; the second product would resemble a link analysis chart depicting the interconnectedness of these Sahelian ethnic groups and tribes. Using these products and understanding the social grievances of each group with the spatial-temporal location would likely be a strong predictor of which groups would be most likely to support AQIM and trans-saharan smuggling activities.

Using SNA to win Political Campaigns

Introduction
Blake Narendra, a recent poster to this blog and classmate at the Fletcher School, observed that “one of the most fascinating applications for social network analysis is in the political realm.” He proposes an SNA of the visitors to the Obama White House to determine who might have the ear of the President. This analysis would certainly be interesting and add to our understanding of the inner workings of the Executive branch – but it’s import for the administration is debatable. After all, if Obama (or CoS Emmanuel) is the one lending an ear, they probably have a good sense of where they turn to most often for advice.

The purpose of this argument is not to disparage Narendra’s proposed study – in fact, I think it is a fascinating one – but rather to propose another use of SNA that is directly tied to every politician’s goal: winning an election.

Political campaigns are constantly looking for new ways to engage and persuade voters, and the Obama campaign’s use of Facebook was groundbreaking in that regard. On the day he launched his Presidential campaign on February 10th, 2007, Barack Obama’s Facebook page had only a small handful of supporters. By the time the campaign was over, he had around 3 million followers – a number that has ballooned to over 23.7 million since the election. The campaign was able to leverage Facebook and other social media tools as a way of creating a weakly-tied community around the campaign/candidate and to push messages to that community.

Study Overview
Social Network Analysis could be used to make campaigns’ use of social media even more beneficial for campaigns. Candidates are always looking to identify key influencers – those individuals that have a particular power to spread the adoption of a behavior or mindset within a network. A study of the growth of the Obama fan community could reveal some fascinating insights about individuals within the network who might be acting as key influencers. The basic idea here would be to study the diffusion of a behavior (“Liking” Obama on Facebook) within what is, admittedly, a very large network.

The eventual goals of this analysis are two-fold:

1. Identify specific individuals who acted as key influencers. The campaign (or the re-election campaign) could then reach out to these individuals directly in an attempt to ensure that Obama continues to receive their support as key influencers in their communities.
2. Create a predictive model based on the attributes of those key influencers that would allow future campaigns to identify key social media influencers. The campaign (or future campaigns) could then use this model to search for additional key influencers online.

Study Design and Methodology
To conduct this analysis, I propose collecting the following information – which is posted by Facebook users (to varying degrees – we would have to live with not having complete attribute information for everyone).

Network Information

• Friendship between individuals as indicated on Facebook

Temporal Information

• Knowing when individuals first “Liked” Obama is essential for mapping the diffusion of the behavior through the network

Attribute Information
Demographics:

• Geographic Location
• Age
• Gender
• Relationship status
• “Interested In…” (a potential indicator of sexual orientation?)
• Geographical Location

Facebook Usage Attributes:

• Number of Facebook friends
• Number of Facebook pages liked
• Number of Facebook groups joined

Personal Information Posted on Facebook:

• Level of Education
• School(s) Attended – may be too varied to be useful
• Employment Status
• Employer(s) – may be too varied to be useful
• Religious views
• Political views
• Networks (as defined by Facebook)
• Favorite Music – probably too varied to be useful, but a potentially great predictor of future key influencers or supporter
• Favorite Books – probably too varied to be useful, but a potentially great predictor of future key influencers or supporter
• Favorite TV Shows – probably too varied to be useful, but a potentially great predictor of future key influencers or supporter

Problems and Pitfalls
One of the over-riding problems with this study proposal is the fact that Facebook data is notoriously difficult to dig into (unless you are a Facebook employee). To the best of my knowledge, the analysis could not be done by someone outside the campaign, but campaign staff might be able to access enough data about individuals who “like” their page to complete the analysis.

A second potential pitfall is the sheer size of the network. 23 million fans, each with (potentially) hundreds of friends and an essentially infinite number of attributes. Mapping a network of that size would require a tremendous amount of computing power. A more practical approach might be to limit the population to a given state (or even a given Congressional district) in an attempt to reduce the size of the network to a more manageable level. The campaign could also examine data from earlier points in time, when the total number of fans was much smaller than it is today.

The third and final consideration is that “friendship” on Facebook is a relatively unsophisticated measure of connection. It does not take into account the strength of ties between individuals, which might yield a more robust analysis of how the “Liking Obama” behavior diffused through the network. However, I would be willing to bet the Facebook has – or is developing – measures of connection strength based on messages and/or wall posts between users. If the research team were able to gain access to this information, it would dramatically strengthen the quality of this analysis.

Conclusion
Overall, this may be a fairly difficult analysis to run, given the difficulties described above. We may be a few years away from developing some of the technical power needed to make this truly robust. However, the potential gains for a campaign from this type of study – even if it is not conducted in the most fool-proof and scientifically rigorous way possible – are huge. Being able to accurately identify key social media influencers could lead to a whole new tool in the persuasion toolbox for campaigns (and, of course, for other behavior-change or information-sharing organizations operating on Facebook as well).

Tweeting terrorism - following extremists in cyber space

THE SPREAD OF RADICAL AGENDAS

An interesting sub-field of counter terrorism in the post 9/11 world has been the study of radicalization. It is believed that terrorists are influenced through a process of incitement, which begins with

According to a report from the New York City police Department, the Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization in the west. This is quite intuitive; the internet provides a certain amount of anonymity and more importantly – a virtual meeting place for those with radical ideas. These meeting places carry even more weight in the west, where radical ideologies aren’t taught at schools or places of worship, but rather have to be sought out by the individual.

Since online social networks allow the spread of idea to a large variety of people in a short amount of time, the danger of incitement becomes even stronger. I would be interested in researching the spread of violent and radical ideas on English speaking Twitter accounts. English language twitter accounts are geared towards potential terrorists in the west. What we refer to as "home grown" terrorists live inside the own culture they are trying to attack, they decide to commit their acts not due to the culture they live in or their family upbringing, but rather due to radicalization through like-minded peers and social networks.

THE TWITTER NETWORK

In recent years terror network communications have become less hierarchal and more flat. There has been a shift from few password protected forums to public online communications often maintained by supporters.

I would choose to focus on the most open of tools, and one that has been used frequently by terror organizations – Twitter. The huge advantage of Twitter for researches is that most information is public. Unless a user chooses to privatize his or her account (rare), anyone can see who one follows and who is followed by them, as well as the content of their posts.

KEY CONCEPTS

One key concept in networks that can help us analyze the spread of extreme ideas is Homophily, the tendency of people to associate with others like themselves.[1] This concept is of strategic importance since it leads us to assume that people in the many of the connections are between likeminded people with similar values or beliefs.

Those following terrorist organizations on Twitter are more likely to be influenced by the ideas and distribute them. In the study of diseases, those who contribute to the spread of the epidemic are the susceptible population. Similarly, with the spread of ideas we can assume that those who “carry” the extreme ideology are predisposed to it. What is especially interesting in this case is that as opposed to the study of health, where we know the conditions that help carry a disease ( poor nutrition or hygenie ), the vulnerable human factors that carry ideology are not always known. Therefore, instead of searching for networks in impoverished areas and follow the disease spread, we will instead follow the disease and learn from it about the attributes.

METHODOLOGY

As mentioned, the huge advantage of twitter is that all information is readily available. I would therefore focus on a few accounts associated with terror organizations and assess their followers.

ATTRIBUTES

I would consider the following attribute for each follower:

1. Number of followers:

a. Below 50 – low influence

b. Between 50-250 – medium influence

c. Over 250 – high influence

The number of followers represent how many people have actively chosen to subscribe to this user’s fee, therefore hey are a good measure of influence.

2. Number following:

a. Over 50 – mildly active

b. Between 50-250 – moderately active

c. Over 250 – extremely active

It is important to note that not all the accounts a chosen user follows will necessarily relate to extremism. However, it is safe to assume that the more followers one has, the more active they are on the network in general and are therefore a good measure for the spread of ideas.

Location:

Many people choose to list location on their Twitter account. Even if location is not listed, it is not impossible to use IP addresses to attempt to track down a general area from which a user is tweeting. The location attribute is extremely important because it allows us to observe whether clusters are formed in certain areas. If we see that many followers of an account are centralized in one are, law enforcement can try to contact a religious leader in that region and warn them about the radicalized population. Religious leaders often work with law enforcement to attempt to de-radicalize members of their community that have been identified as potentially harmful.

TIES

I assume this network will be decentralized and scale-free as is often the case with internet connections.

Inedegree and outdegree ties of nodes will be of extreme importance.

1. a. Indegree centrality – how many people follow a certain node?

b. b. Outdegree centrality– how many people does a certain node follow?

Though the strength of these ties cannot be measured, this measurement offers three great advantages for the researcher:

1. Simplicity – the ties are very clear: you wither follow someone on twitter or you don’t. These are not subject to possible manipulations in surveys

2. Identifying Closeness – this is a huge advantage in the field of counter terrorism since it allows us to identify who is connected to people and can reach the most users in the least amount of steps.

3. Density – identifying whether a network is dense or not can have great implications in the field of Counter Terrorism. It will allow us to assume how well connected and organized a movement is, or whether it is made of loose nodes that are not necessarily all communicating with each other frequently.

ADVANCED RESEARCH

Advanced research can also measure tie strength by taking into account which users are communicating with each other. Once again, the advantage of this method is that all communications on Twitter are public, though the collection of data would be time consuming.

Collecting data on a number of user interactions would allow us to re-categorize and examine tie strengths: Which users communicated more than once? Which ones communicate on a weekly or monthly basis? In addition, directed and undirected closeness can show us who receives more messages (can imply that this person is a central source of information) and who sends more messages (this person is more eager to collect information)

CAVEATS

It is important to remember that this research, like many, has some caveats that must be taken into account. Most importantly, it is important to recognize that not all followers of terrorist Twitter accounts are necessarily extremists. In addition, even if one individual appears to be well connected, it does not mean this is grounds for action for law enforcement. However, as I mentioned, we have much to learn regarding density, location clusters and closeness from information that is 100% public, it just needs to be sorted!

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[1] Valenta, Thomas, Social Networks and Health: Models, Methods, and Applications, Oxford Press 2010

Using SNA to spread knowledge of a language

While South Sudan rejoiced when it became the world’s newest country in July, 2011, it was clear that the new state had a long road ahead before it could prove itself as a viable nation. In order to foster a national identity, South Sudan needs a focused approach to creating a nationalist sentiment and feeling of unity. An important factor in this regard is choosing a new national and official language. Earlier this month, South Sudan announced English as its new official language. Although there is a clear rationale for this choice (distinction from the North, ease of international communication), it also presents a unique challenge; currently only 8% of South Sudanese speak English proficiently[1]. To rectify this severe capacity gap and ensure that the South Sudanese language choice becomes a unifying, and not a divisive factor, social network analysis has an important role to play.

To the best of my knowledge, social network analysis has only been applied to pre-existing linguistic groups, rather than the dissemination of a new language among a population. Perhaps because the formation of a new country is so rare in this era, there is little precedent for a countrywide effort to build proficiency in a language as widely and quickly as South Sudan aims to.

In her book Language and Social Networks, published in 1980, Milroy addressed the social networks of Belfast, Northern Ireland as they related to particular vernaculars. While this research is not entirely applicable to the spread of a new language, it confirms the significance of language in structuring social networks and building identities. Milroy comments,

“Haugen hints at one obvious linguistic consequence of these changes in network structure, noting that ‘the modern nation state…extends some of the loyalties of the family and the neighbourhood or the clan to the whole state. Language and nation have become inextricably intertwined” (186)

Given that language is perhaps uniquely positioned to have such a unifying effect, I am particularly interested in how the new Government of South Sudan will facilitate the spread of English through the country in an effective and conflict sensitive manner. A well-designed Social Network Analysis could be a crucial step in identifying the best ways to achieve this.

Currently, the IIEP, a branch of UNESCO, is working with the new South Sudanese Ministry of Education on developing an Education Sector Strategic Plan, which will detail plans for enhancing the English language capacity of the education system with close regard to conflict sensitivity[2]. In order for a social network analysis to be feasible and productive, more information would need to be provided by this partnership about how the Plan envisions spreading English teaching resources. Documents currently available point to an ad hoc system, in which various NGO’s and Agencies have offered technical assistance sporadically. Unfortunately, South Sudan’s low levels of school enrollment and serious lack of infrastructure for schooling (which are emphasized in Marc Sommers’ book, Islands of Education, Schooling, Civil War and the Southern Sudanese) mean that an ad hoc system for improving English capacity is very likely to miss large portions of the population.

To start off on an equitable basis, the Government/international community could identify existing social network structures among the South Sudanese that could serve as useful channels for spreading English to those who may otherwise be left out. Beyond a hierarchical approach to English training (which may be seen as favoring a particular tribe, or fostering a new, elite class that has access to the international community), a social network analysis would allow us new ways to envision spreading language, and could consider utilizing the pre-existing network of trade routes. Once large markets are identified and trade routes are mapped, the next step would be to use a SNA to gauge how well connected the people/groups frequenting these markets are (and thus how likely to pass on newly acquired language skills). To measure this, it would be important to consider the following centrality measures:

· Degree Centrality: those markets/meeting centers that have the most trade routes to the most other markets/meeting centers

· Betweenness: those markets/meeting centers that the most people pass through to reach others

To gain a more complete understanding of how useful these trade centers could be as focal points for English training, a survey (or potentially a simple desk study) could address the following questions:

· How often do certain people/groups pass through the trade center?

· What language do they currently communicate in?

· How many different trade centers do they travel to?

· How long do they typically stay at a particular trade center?

· How much do they interact with people from different regions at the trade center?

Of course, once these measures have been studied, there remain many practical concerns, including the level of pre-existing institutional capacity to provide English training, and presence of teachers in the area. To ensure equitability, it would also be important to consider how the existing network of trade routes may already exclude particular groups, which could include particular income level, ethnic group, or gender bias. However, knowledge of how people throughout the country are actually interacting, combined with an understanding of the above factors, would be a very useful step in identifying key areas for spreading English quickly through a framework other than the flawed school system.

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[1] Ahmed Gumaa Siddiek, “Language and Education as Factors of Sustainable Relation between the Northern and Southern Sudan Post-Secession,” Research Journal of International Studies, no. 17 (November 2010): 68-87.

[2] “Why Education Will Foster Stability in an Independent South Sudan” (UNESCO, IIEP, July 9, 2011).

SNA of a US Embassy

The American staff at US Embassies is in constant flux since Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) are assigned to one embassy for two to four years. On the other hand, the Locally Employed Staff (LES) at the embassies is comprised of local citizens who retain their posts for many years. Diplomacy is based on building and maintaining relationships, and networks of relationships, so how are these relationships perpetuated with such consistent and frequent turnover of FSOs? Incoming FSOs are dependent upon their predecessors leaving detailed notes of their knowledge and contacts as well as the information provided by the LES as they learn about their new post. Additionally, new FSOs must be introduced to the networks outside the embassy and within in order to be successful diplomats. Due to the dichotomic relationship of LES and FSOs – with LES having large amounts of information and access to social networks, a social network analysis of a US embassy could be particularly insightful and helpful. The built-in high turnover rate adds an additional point of interest for a social network analysis of such a traditionally hierarchical organization.

An SNA of an embassy would have to pass approval by the State Department and the ambassador at the targeted embassy. Once approved, the SNA could be conducted through use of a survey posted online. In the survey it would be extremely important to use directed ties.

Since diplomacy is based on relationships, a survey would need to include communication questions on two different levels:

1) How often do you turn to this person for information?

2) How often do you turn to this person for introductions to others within the embassy?

3) How often do you turn to this person for introductions to others outside the embassy?

Attribute questions:

1) FSO or LES

2) Rank (GS level)

3) Gender

4) Track (Management, Economic, Political, Public Diplomacy, Consular)

5) Length of time at post

Such an analysis could answer, and bring up, many questions. We assume that the FSOs are turning to the LES for information, but to what extent is that true? Who are the brokers or bottlenecks? Who are the bridges? How does length of service at post affect a person’s connectivity in the network? Are the tracks very isolated from one another? Do the FSOs and LES have sufficient contact? It would also be important to see how gender affects interactions.

Is the Occupy Wall Street message becoming lost online?

This article from the BBC discusses the positive and negative effects of social media on the Occupy Wall Street movement. It brings up the positive point of social media acting as a tool to connect groups who otherwise would not have been in a network and also the lack of a coordinated message due to the non-hierarchical system and each "node's" access to social media outlets.

After the Revolution: Using SNA to try and understand what happens next

This past year the world was held captive by how activists in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya used social networks to mobilize and organize against their governments. The Arab Spring shouldn’t be interpreted as a movement towards modernity by a backwards and oppressed people but as what Alain Badiou calls an event —a previously unexpected moment which allows all kinds of opportunities while creating new problems and challenges (see his writings Being and Event and Logic of Worlds). Perhaps new dictators will emerge, or new Islamist movements (which have become the specters haunting the liberal West) but other possibilities also co-exist in the chaotic present. In the Arab Spring’s initial phase, in the moment of the event, we observe the successful deployment of networks to develop and present a positive and truthful alternative to the reactionary message of the governing elite. The world saw many groups (or sub-networks) join together under a common goal to help remove these regimes from power—students, unionists, lawyers, teachers, human rights activists, and online dissidents (http://www.technologyreview.com/web/38379/). Beyond both constructing and promoting an alternative message, using few resources, networks served as a medium to mobilize and coordinate resistance, both peaceful and violent.

But it appears when the moment has passed and the event has occurred, the online social persona which was the public face of change loses its influence and its voice as a force for social cohesion. Focus is lost, anarchy rises and, as in Egypt senseless and unproductive violence begins, as evidenced by attacks against the Coptic minority. This leads us to ask what should the role of networks be after the event, can it be repurposed as a force for social cohesion, can it evolve ahead of the populace which it mobilized, or is it the fate of such an online voice to be overtaken and made irrelevant by the second and following acts of social transformation.

Social Network Analysis might be able to provide some insight into the above question as well as providing the international community (both NGOs and governments) with an understanding of what will happen next and how to be most useful and helpful in helping to prevent countries from falling into anarchy.

Information Sources:

In some sense information is both abundant and hard to come by. Communications and messages between individuals will probably be the easiest to come by – looking at tweets, facebook messages, youtube media, blogs, emails, phone records etc. However, it is important to note that even in this area information will be lacking – for instance, in person communications and group meetings which in some cases could solidify connections and trust. Finding attribute data and determining which sub-network an individual affiliates with might be more difficult – since activists have had to keep their identities secret for security reasons.

Methodology:

Identifying characteristics of group members

a. Role: Does the individual post original content, or re-post information to forward the message on? Does the individual play the role of spokesperson in the international arena (interviewed by foreign news organizations)?

b. Age

c. Type of Employment, lack of employment?

d. Type of education?

e. Socio-economic class

f. Ethnic/Religious group/Race

Note: Items b-f will help identify the population make-up of the network. Is it made-up of mostly youth? Persecuted ethnic or religious groups? Large support from the entire population as a whole?

g. Language skills/ability (does the individual have the ability to communicate with people outside of their network/country?

Identifying characteristics or an issue network of each sub-network and then overlaying them.

a. Why did the sub network decide to join the greater network?

b. What is the ranking in order of importance their goals? i.e. once one goal is achieved what will be their next priority – and how does that relate to the goals (and their importance) of the other sub-networks

c. Ability of the sub-network to access resources to influence decisions regarding their issues

In a perfect world, a network analysis would have to be done on the network as a whole and on the individual sub-networks. Identifying the key influencers within each sub-network and then the bridges between each sub-network. Some questions that would need to be answered to accomplish this is:

a. Who does the person interact with both in their sub-network and sub-network?

b. Direction of ties- Are they reciprocated or just in one direction (look at this both within an individual’s sub-network and in interactions between sub-networks)? Are the leaders of the sub-networks also bridging between other sub-networks or are these different individuals?

2) Position in the network

a. Who has the most number of ties in the network? What role(s) do these people perform?

b. Who is tied to the most influential people in the network (at both the sub-network level and network as a whole)?

Several important network measures include:

1) Ego networks- Who are the key personnel in terms of facilitating these connections?

2) Network distance- This is important in terms of establishing how ties between sub-networks may be organized. In order to send communication and information, how many people does this transmission require?

3) Organizational holes – where is it most likely that the larger network will start breaking down? How can this be prevented? How large is the hole and can it easily be “patched”.

The above is just a start in trying to understand what happens after what Alain Badiou calls the event, and how, if at all possible, now and in the future after the “event” has occurred to prevent a country from slipping into anarchy.

Using SNA to analyze ties between terrorist organizations

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a significant growth in the study of terrorism, as academics, analysts, and policymakers seek to understand the makeup and structure of terrorist organizations, including their relationships with other entities. These connections, referred to as inter-organizational ties, seek to explain how and why militant organizations cultivate, maintain, and benefit from ties to other terrorist groups. Mainstream reporting and analysis by newspapers, think tanks, academics, and government sources routinely make strong statements and accusations that terrorist groups are tied to one another. For example, Hamas and Hizballah are operationally connected, provide financial support and training to each other, and so on.

Yet in many cases there is little established criteria to critically evaluate what constitutes a relationship between two militant organizations, or in what ways groups may be tied together. Are the ties simply based on a personal relationship between two officials or are there established lines of cooperation between the groups? In other words, allegations are commonly made (for political and other motivations), without providing in-depth analysis of what actually constitutes inter-organizational ties and how we can more precisely analyze them.

There is some existing academic literature on this topic, though the vast majority of studies have focused on the makeup and structure within individual terrorist networks, rather than the ties between groups. In “Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence” (http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=pn_wp), Perliger and Pedahzur provide a concise summary of how SNA can be used to study terrorist organizations, emphasizing the analysis of the roles of personnel within terrorist networks and identifying vulnerable structures. In “Terrorist Alliances: Consequences for Effectiveness” (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1942441_code1147966.pdf?abstractid=1787599&mirid=1), Horowitz and Potter argue that the topic of strategic alliances between terrorist organizations is understudied. They offer an analytical framework that links group alliances with lethality, arguing that those terrorist organizations that have deep alliances with other militant groups have the capacity to carry out more complex and lethal attacks as compared to groups with weak or no ties to other militant networks.

There are numerous case studies where the analysis of inter-organizational ties may be applied. In Nigeria, the radical Islamist militant movement Boko Haram, which was founded in the early to mid-2000s and is based in northern Nigeria, has increasingly carried out large-scale attacks, including suicide bombings, against Nigerian security forces and numerous political and civilian targets. Based on the increased violence that is taking place in Nigeria, Boko Haram’s organizational ties have become a growing focus.

In August 2011, the New York Times quoted General Carter Ham, the head of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), as stating that Boko Haram is seeking to establish a “loose partnership” with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), based in Algeria, and al-Shabaab, based in Somalia; another top U.S. official described “an alliance of convenience” between the three groups. U.S. Department of Defense officials argued that the explosive devices used by Boko Haram in recent attacks were very similar to those used by AQIM, suggesting collaboration between the two groups (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/africa/18nigeria.html?pagewanted=all, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/africa/three-terrorist-groups-in-africa-pose-threat-to-us-general-ham-says.html). Such allegations rest on the assumption that Boko Haram’s increasingly militancy is being enabled by its foreign ties. Essentially, groups such as AQIM and al-Shabaab are providing Boko Haram with the necessary technical expertise, funding, and personnel to increase both the frequency and lethality of their attacks.

But surely there is a more precise way to evaluate such relationships and support these allegations. Does a terrorist group utilizing the tactics of another organization mean that the two groups are cooperating with each other? Or can a group simply observe the activities of similar organizations and incorporate those relevant strategies into its operations without structural ties between the groups? In this context, a social network analysis would be extremely effective in assessing the accuracy of the accusations that Boko Haram has increased its organizational ties, and analyzing the nature of these ties, if they are found to exist.

In this type of social network analysis, relevant data may be hard to come by. Much of the information detailing ties between terrorist organizations and other illicit actors is only available in the classified domain, and the extent that such data is attainable in the public sphere, it is often largely anecdotal and not representative of broader trends, which in this case is a relationship between terrorist groups.

Given that information on ties between different terrorist organizations is unlikely to be provided voluntarily, such information would have to be gleaned from studying records of electronic and phone communications, travel documents, physical meetings, financial transactions, weapons and explosives sales and transfers, militant training camps, and other related interactions. Much of this information may be obtained through covert sources, while other data may be acquired from captured records or files (such as the wealth of information collected by U.S. forces in Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan). Assuming that the U.S. government has access to such information in large quantities, conducting a social network analysis is feasible.

Several types of attributes are important in examining the personnel of Boko Haram, as well as AQIM and al-Shabaab, its alleged allies:

1) Identifying characteristics of group members

a. Role- operational planner, fighter, financier, courier, explosives expert, spokesman, etc.

b. Area of operation(s)

2) Operational experience

a. Years with the organization

b. Previous militant experience

c. Method of recruitment into the organization (Through an existing member? If so, what position in the group does that person occupy)

Several types of connections are also important to analyze:

1) Trends of interaction

a. Who does the person interact with both in their organization and other organizations?

b. Frequency of ties- This is very important, as simply knowing someone else may not signify a meaningful or substantive relationship. Within the context of connections between terrorist groups, frequent and ongoing ties are significant.

c. Direction of ties- Are they going in just one direction or are they reciprocated? Does this align with the perceptions of the ties between the groups? (i.e. money, arms, personnel going from one organization to another)

2) Position in the network

a. Who are the key bridges that facilitate connections (financial, knowledge, weapons, etc.) to other organizations?

b. Who has the most number of ties in the network? What role(s) do these people perform?

c. Who is tied to the most influential people in the organization?

It is also important to consider the type of organization that is being analyzed. For example, hierarchical groups may develop and maintain their organizational connections through top officials, while decentralized groups may allow more mid-level personnel to establish and sustain relationships with other organizations.

Several important network measures include:

1) Network distance- This is important in terms of establishing how ties between terrorist organizations may be organized. In order to send a communication, money transfer, or weapons, how many people does this transmission require?

2) Ego networks- Who are the key personnel in terms of facilitating these connections?

Linkages between terrorist organizations may be leveled by political or military officials with an agenda that seeks to advocate for a more aggressive policy toward such groups. Using a social network analysis to evaluate such ties, specifically focusing on if they exist, and if so, to what extent, would provide for a more informed policy-making process that can offer more targeted solutions. Moreover, a social network analysis may be used to determine if such connections can offer a predictive value. In this sense, do the relationships between terrorist organizations reveal trends about how attacks are carried out? Do major financial transactions, weapons transfers, or other interactions precede an attack? Do deeper relationships between terrorist organizations give groups greater militant capabilities? Examining these questions through the use of social network analysis may yield useful information about how terrorist organizations develop and operate relationships with other militant groups.