Mapping Social Movements and Political Parties in Egypt

Introduction

Much has been written about the proliferation of political parties in post-Mubarak Egypt, particularly in light of parliamentary elections scheduled for November 28. The role of networks in determining the success of social movements (and similarly oriented forms of social protest) has been described and discussed extensively. But can revolutionaries govern as effectively as they mobilize and organize? When called to govern by their supporters, what are the determinants of success?

Background

This summer, I had the chance to visit Egypt and research political party development and infrastructure following Mubarak's ouster. While there, I met with party officials, former members of Parliament, and other activists. I was particularly interested in party organization--how parties elected their leadership, how they recruited and trained candidates, and how they developed their messages. Most of this was new to the people I interviewed. They were quickly able to explain what they didn't want, but they didn't really have a well-constructed vision of the future.

I also discovered that the success of the Revolution was determined in large part by social networks. One activist went so far as to say that the Revolutionary Youth Coalition actually had no political power--save the ability to pack Tahrir Square with protestors with a day's notice. That being said, the Revolution was successful because individuals developed networks that became increasingly impenetrable: they could recruit, communicate, and attract supporters with less fear over time.

Methodology

Let us start with a relatively straightforward research question: how can networks involved in social protest change to adapt to the challenge of governance? SNA can certainly help us find an answer, but the solution might not necessarily lie in extensively mapping individual networks and a knowledge of who people are talking to, and how. The determinants of electoral success are certainly network-oriented, but we're trying to understand how, specifically, a network must adapt given changes to its environment. I would propose the following comparative method.

First, map two networks. The first network should be that of a protest movement--in this case, the Revolutionary Youth Council or the April 6 Movement. Then, map the network of a more organized, established political party. In this case, we might look at Al Wafd--one of Egypt's oldest political parties with an established organizational structure.

Then, compare each network's properties:

1. How does each network conceive of centrality? What's the right mix of centralization/decentralization?

2. In which direction does information/action flow?

3. Do bridges evolve geographically? Functionally? Where are they located? What are the barriers to entry to small clusters?

4. Measure closeness--protestors probably shouldn't be too close to their leaders, but that might not work for a party organization.

5. Reach--does everyone know how the party is faring in different districts/governorates? Can resources be allocated quickly and efficiently?

6. Measure cohesion--perhaps a lack of cohesion degrades a party's message.

All of these factors and properties are important, and will likely allow us to paint a picture of success for nascent parties. The determinants of network success in protest movements differs from that of parties, but there's reason to believe that macro-adjustments to these networks enhance their chances for success.

Conclusions

In this case, I want to again emphasize that while knowledge of the network is important and relevant, this analysis is comparative. We did not talk at length in class about comparative network analyses, but I think a study like this would be timely. In societies like Egypt, we often see the same ancien regime officials emerge and claim power in times of change--largely because they understand electoral success and they have developed structures to perpetuate it. Protest movements might fair just as well if they knew how best to transform their networks when political space is created.