Using SNA to analyze ties between terrorist organizations

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a significant growth in the study of terrorism, as academics, analysts, and policymakers seek to understand the makeup and structure of terrorist organizations, including their relationships with other entities. These connections, referred to as inter-organizational ties, seek to explain how and why militant organizations cultivate, maintain, and benefit from ties to other terrorist groups. Mainstream reporting and analysis by newspapers, think tanks, academics, and government sources routinely make strong statements and accusations that terrorist groups are tied to one another. For example, Hamas and Hizballah are operationally connected, provide financial support and training to each other, and so on.

Yet in many cases there is little established criteria to critically evaluate what constitutes a relationship between two militant organizations, or in what ways groups may be tied together. Are the ties simply based on a personal relationship between two officials or are there established lines of cooperation between the groups? In other words, allegations are commonly made (for political and other motivations), without providing in-depth analysis of what actually constitutes inter-organizational ties and how we can more precisely analyze them.

There is some existing academic literature on this topic, though the vast majority of studies have focused on the makeup and structure within individual terrorist networks, rather than the ties between groups. In “Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence” (http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=pn_wp), Perliger and Pedahzur provide a concise summary of how SNA can be used to study terrorist organizations, emphasizing the analysis of the roles of personnel within terrorist networks and identifying vulnerable structures. In “Terrorist Alliances: Consequences for Effectiveness” (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1942441_code1147966.pdf?abstractid=1787599&mirid=1), Horowitz and Potter argue that the topic of strategic alliances between terrorist organizations is understudied. They offer an analytical framework that links group alliances with lethality, arguing that those terrorist organizations that have deep alliances with other militant groups have the capacity to carry out more complex and lethal attacks as compared to groups with weak or no ties to other militant networks.

There are numerous case studies where the analysis of inter-organizational ties may be applied. In Nigeria, the radical Islamist militant movement Boko Haram, which was founded in the early to mid-2000s and is based in northern Nigeria, has increasingly carried out large-scale attacks, including suicide bombings, against Nigerian security forces and numerous political and civilian targets. Based on the increased violence that is taking place in Nigeria, Boko Haram’s organizational ties have become a growing focus.

In August 2011, the New York Times quoted General Carter Ham, the head of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), as stating that Boko Haram is seeking to establish a “loose partnership” with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), based in Algeria, and al-Shabaab, based in Somalia; another top U.S. official described “an alliance of convenience” between the three groups. U.S. Department of Defense officials argued that the explosive devices used by Boko Haram in recent attacks were very similar to those used by AQIM, suggesting collaboration between the two groups (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/africa/18nigeria.html?pagewanted=all, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/africa/three-terrorist-groups-in-africa-pose-threat-to-us-general-ham-says.html). Such allegations rest on the assumption that Boko Haram’s increasingly militancy is being enabled by its foreign ties. Essentially, groups such as AQIM and al-Shabaab are providing Boko Haram with the necessary technical expertise, funding, and personnel to increase both the frequency and lethality of their attacks.

But surely there is a more precise way to evaluate such relationships and support these allegations. Does a terrorist group utilizing the tactics of another organization mean that the two groups are cooperating with each other? Or can a group simply observe the activities of similar organizations and incorporate those relevant strategies into its operations without structural ties between the groups? In this context, a social network analysis would be extremely effective in assessing the accuracy of the accusations that Boko Haram has increased its organizational ties, and analyzing the nature of these ties, if they are found to exist.

In this type of social network analysis, relevant data may be hard to come by. Much of the information detailing ties between terrorist organizations and other illicit actors is only available in the classified domain, and the extent that such data is attainable in the public sphere, it is often largely anecdotal and not representative of broader trends, which in this case is a relationship between terrorist groups.

Given that information on ties between different terrorist organizations is unlikely to be provided voluntarily, such information would have to be gleaned from studying records of electronic and phone communications, travel documents, physical meetings, financial transactions, weapons and explosives sales and transfers, militant training camps, and other related interactions. Much of this information may be obtained through covert sources, while other data may be acquired from captured records or files (such as the wealth of information collected by U.S. forces in Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan). Assuming that the U.S. government has access to such information in large quantities, conducting a social network analysis is feasible.

Several types of attributes are important in examining the personnel of Boko Haram, as well as AQIM and al-Shabaab, its alleged allies:

1) Identifying characteristics of group members

a. Role- operational planner, fighter, financier, courier, explosives expert, spokesman, etc.

b. Area of operation(s)

2) Operational experience

a. Years with the organization

b. Previous militant experience

c. Method of recruitment into the organization (Through an existing member? If so, what position in the group does that person occupy)

Several types of connections are also important to analyze:

1) Trends of interaction

a. Who does the person interact with both in their organization and other organizations?

b. Frequency of ties- This is very important, as simply knowing someone else may not signify a meaningful or substantive relationship. Within the context of connections between terrorist groups, frequent and ongoing ties are significant.

c. Direction of ties- Are they going in just one direction or are they reciprocated? Does this align with the perceptions of the ties between the groups? (i.e. money, arms, personnel going from one organization to another)

2) Position in the network

a. Who are the key bridges that facilitate connections (financial, knowledge, weapons, etc.) to other organizations?

b. Who has the most number of ties in the network? What role(s) do these people perform?

c. Who is tied to the most influential people in the organization?

It is also important to consider the type of organization that is being analyzed. For example, hierarchical groups may develop and maintain their organizational connections through top officials, while decentralized groups may allow more mid-level personnel to establish and sustain relationships with other organizations.

Several important network measures include:

1) Network distance- This is important in terms of establishing how ties between terrorist organizations may be organized. In order to send a communication, money transfer, or weapons, how many people does this transmission require?

2) Ego networks- Who are the key personnel in terms of facilitating these connections?

Linkages between terrorist organizations may be leveled by political or military officials with an agenda that seeks to advocate for a more aggressive policy toward such groups. Using a social network analysis to evaluate such ties, specifically focusing on if they exist, and if so, to what extent, would provide for a more informed policy-making process that can offer more targeted solutions. Moreover, a social network analysis may be used to determine if such connections can offer a predictive value. In this sense, do the relationships between terrorist organizations reveal trends about how attacks are carried out? Do major financial transactions, weapons transfers, or other interactions precede an attack? Do deeper relationships between terrorist organizations give groups greater militant capabilities? Examining these questions through the use of social network analysis may yield useful information about how terrorist organizations develop and operate relationships with other militant groups.