2nd
Half Social Network Analysis Project Proposal by Drew Keneally
Background:
While the
so-called Islamic State has been in the news for the last few years over its
fighting in Iraq and Syria, there is another battle playing out globally
between ISIS and its precursor organization Al Qaeda. Indeed, the two
organizations are competing in many countries throughout the Middle East and
North Africa. This battle manifests in a variety of ways, including competition
over recruitment, direct violent conflict, external terrorist attacks, and
others that may not be so obvious. Over the last couple of years, ISIS has been
able to lure away AQ-linked groups, and large parts of AQ-linked fighters. ISIS
has done this in several ways, including ideological appeal with the common
claim Al Qaeda “lacks purity” in its mission.[1] The organizations differ on how global jihad should be carried out, and engage in direct conflict in several countries.
Social Network
Analysis will be crucial in identifying how this inter-organization conflict
manifests by visualizing past and present connections, and common attributes of
those connections. Additionally, it will hopefully provide lots of material for
analysis on which groups might have “staying power,” as well as the nature of
how affiliations are formed, fostered, and progress.
Question(s):
The major
questions I have about this phenomenon are related to a) the conflict between
IS and AQ, and b) the future of these affiliated organizations.
What attributes
are associated with groups that have left/split from AQ and pledged allegiance
to ISIS? What can these attributes tell
us about the future of current groups affiliated with ISIS?
What can they
tell us about how ISIS and AQ are interacting and competing for recruits and
influence in global terrorism?
Hypothesis:
I believe the
data will show a correlation between ideological ties and strength, and thus
the potential for these groups to exist beyond the defeat of IS ground forces
in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, it could possibly make distinction/identify
relationships between groups who provide oaths of allegiance for political
expedience, resource dependency, and ideology. Indeed, the hope is that this
data provides insight into not only what the future of global terrorism holds,
but may offer preliminary strategies on how to preempt the emergence of the
next ISIS.
Methodology:
I will have to
build my own dataset for UCINet purposes; however, much of the information I
need is available from open sources including Professor Crenshaw’s mapping
militants project, and research I have already undertaken as part of my internship
from this past summer.
Network Data
will include:
-
Pledged
Bay’aa to larger organizations, and publicly accepted Bay’aa from affiliates
o
Strength
of these ties will include:
§
Provided
monetary sources
§
Provided
leadership resources
§
Ideological
origins of ties
Attribute Data
will include:
-
Strength
in numbers
-
When
bay’aa was made
-
When
a group left /split from AQ if applicable
-
Location
of Group
-
Number
of attacks
-
Location
of attacks
-
Ideology
-
Competition
method(s)
o
Violence
o
Media/propaganda
o
Ideological
persuasion
o
Indirect
attacks
Questions to be
answered in the data include, but are not limited to:
In what arenas
are ISIS and Al-Qaeda engaged in competition for group affiliation?
-
How
does this competition manifest? Recruitment? Violence? Competing Attacks?
-
When
did this begin, and what can we tell about the parent organization and
affiliate by the timing of the bay’aa?
What groups are
strongest in number, and why (ideology or resources)?
-
Similarly,
what groups are the most prolific in terms of attacks? Recruitment? Geographic
spread?
-
Do
any of these relationships indicate what is most important indicator of
strength in an affiliate, (allegiance, ideology, leadership, resources, etc.)?
- Do attacks demonstrate inter-organizational competition? (IS traditionally focused on near targets, AQ on Western targets)
Tie-strengths
and subgrouping, (Girvan-Newman in particular), will provide a way to group affiliated
groups based on attribute data. We can then draw important conclusions on
potential longevity and interconnectivity/activity after ISIS is defeated.
Conclusion:
In order to plan
long-term military and CVE strategies, policy makers and intelligence agencies
need to look beyond just defeating ISIS. By looking at the evolution of groups’
affiliations from AQ to ISIS, we can better understand the spread of these
groups, indicators of strength, and how these groups might evolve in the
future.
[1]
Jason Malsin. “What to know about the deadly ISIS Al Qaeda Rivalry,” Time; Nov. 24 2015. http://time.com/4124810/isis-al-qaeda-rivalry-terror-attacks-mali-paris/
1 comment:
Interesting, especially if you can get your hands on a meaningful data set. Some improvement suggestions: I'm concerned that you're talking more about data correlation (e.g. between ideological ties and strength) than networks. While that's a potentially valid statistical approach, I'm not sure how this will connect with your networks of those who've pledged their support. And you need to come up with a better question, one that connects to the need to do an SNA to get the outcomes you're looking for. The Qs you have seem mostly about attributes, or flat data. Let's talk.
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