Andrew Taylor
Proposed Topic: Applying the Crime-Terror Nexus to the Sahel
Background
Social network
analysis would be incredibly useful and illuminating for my capstone, which
seeks to categorize the relationship between terrorist groups and transnational
criminal organizations in the Sahel region of Africa. In order to categorize
the relationship, I applied the theoretical framework developed Tamara
Makarenko known as the Crime-Terror
Continuum (see below for an in-depth description).
Terrorist and
other non-state armed groups have been a major cause in the political
instability of the region since decolonization. Marginalization of the ethnic
Tuareg communities and the appeal of the jihadist ideology of Al-Qaeda have
allowed such groups to thrive. One element I looked at was the tangible support
these groups received from connections with organized crime.
The Crime-Terror Continuum
The Continuum’s
visual and conceptual representation has evolved since its introduction in 2003.
The first iteration included a “basic linear model”[1] with two distinct types of
groups (criminal and terrorist) on a single plane. This model included a
sliding scale where groups could be placed into four different categories: (1)
Alliances, (2) Appropriation of Tactics/Operational Motivations (3) Convergence
(of political or criminal interests), and (4) Black Hole.[2]
Figure 1: The Original Crime-Terror
Continuum, 2004.[3]
The Continuum
was modified “to account for the various linkages between OC and terrorism as
they have emerged and evolved in a number of different regions, while
highlighting a more sophisticated phenomenon which operates within a series of
planes.”[4] The
spectrum now includes a gradual progression with additional points where
integration occurs and the organizations becomes a hybrid. There are three
different planes: operational, organizational, and evolutionary. On the
operational level (first plane), the first entails a tactical alliance between
the two distinct groups for “mutual operational benefits,”[5] and the second node denotes the
group’s appropriation of tactics from the ‘other’.[6]
It is on the
second plane where the criminal or terrorist group goes beyond mimicking the
tactics of the other. From the terrorist perspective, an example of this would
occur if the group incorporates “criminal capabilities into their logistical
and support structures.” [7] In
the following node, “a hybrid entity emerges and simultaneously displays
ideological and economic motivations by perpetrating acts of politically
motivated terrorism and engaging in OC for profit maximization.”[8]
At the third
plane of Evolution/Transformation, the group in question transcends the nexus between
a criminal or terrorist group, and has fully changed its tactics and motivations.[9] Makarenko
finds no contemporary evidence which shows that such a radical change has
occurred in an organized criminal or terrorist group.[10]
Figure 2: The Refined Crime-Terror Continuum,
2013.[11]
Another more
recent version of the Continuum accentuates the distinct nature of each group through
separate strands that transcend their respective planes and intersect.
Figure 3: The Refined Crime-Terror
Continuum, 2014.[12]
Data
If I were to complete
this project, I would use the data from the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Organized and/or Transnational Crime/Drug Cartel Nexus with Illicit
Radiological/Nuclear Trade, Smuggling and/or Terrorism in Europe and North,
Sahelian and West Africa.[13]
I have reached out to some of the researchers as well as some contacts I developed
from my internship there, but have yet to get a response.
Methodology
The
coding process for this study would be quite tedious, but still possible. I
have interned with START before and seen firsthand the lengthy process. Some pieces
of data may be easy to code. For example, a confirmed case where a Terrorist
Organization (TO) granted passage for smugglers would be marked as an “alliance.”
The aforementioned study identified 143 TO’s and 381 TCO’s[14],
which would serve in this case as individual nodes and connections could be
made from there. There are plenty of possible variables, but below are some of
the most useful in identifying the nexus:
·
Type of event (attack, flow of goods)
·
Actor/type of actor
·
Name and number of TCO’s
·
Name and number of TO’s
·
Number of known “links” between organizations,
which can include:
o
Geographic overlap (can use the TransIT Tool and
Global Terrorism database to find overlap between smuggling routes and
terrorist attacks). The START research identified certain choke points, which
could show if there is a strong correlation between TCO and TO activity.
o
Individuals with connections between TCO’s and
TO’s
o
Events where both TCO and TO were present (e.g.,
joint assault or operation).
·
Number and nature of interactions between TCO’s
and TO’s:
o
Alliance (basic cooperation/interaction between TCO
and TO)
o
Appropriation of Tactics (e.g., kidnapping for
ransom, assault with small arms)
o
Integration (an example is the Taliban using opium
profits to fund operations)
o
Hybrid (e.g., media analysis of public
statements as well as studying events) An example is Mokhtar Belmokhtar who is
a known jihadist but also known as Mr. Marlboro, a prolific cigarette
trafficker. Many question whether his loyalty lies with the ideological cause
or if he is simply out to make a profit – perhaps both!
Conclusion
There
are plenty of other variables and aspects that could be studied in this case,
but the criteria listed above would be a very good starting point. Putting a
value together that is based in empirical evidence, rather than anecdotal or
speculative evidence, would provide a much stronger backing for policies that
would be implemented to counter terrorist or organized crime.
[1] Makarenko, Tamara. "A Model of
Terrorist-Criminal Relations." Janes intelligence review 15,
no. 8 (2003): 6-11.
[2] Tamara Makarenko (2004) The Crime-Terror Continuum:
Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,
Global Crime, 6:1, 129-145, DOI: 10.1080/1744057042000297025
[3] Makarenko, Tamara. "A Model of
Terrorist-Criminal Relations." Janes intelligence review 15,
no. 8 (2003): 6-11.
[4] Tamara Makarenko & Michael Mesquita (2014)
Categorising the crime–terror nexus in the European Union, Global Crime,
15:3-4, 259-274, DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2014.931227
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Makarenko, Tamara. Europe’s
Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the
European Union. Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee,
European Parliament, 2012.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/462503/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2012)462503_EN.pdf
[8] Makarenko ,“Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between
Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union”
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid, p. 12
[12] Makarenko & Mesquita, p. 260
[13]
http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/organized-andor-transnational-crimedrug-cartel-nexus-illicit-radiologicalnuclear
[14]
http://www.start.umd.edu/news/hybrid-organizations-have-greater-motivational-and-operations-ability-rn-trafficking
1 comment:
Tedious coding, yes, but a really interesting project. The Continuum is a great place to start, but the difficulty is finding the right networks to study and making the case for SNA. I wish you had speculated on that a bit more, as I know that there are others interested in developing a network approach to looking at OC and terror to look as leadership and other issues, ands they could benefit from fresh thinking by someone who's just taken the course.. Among those interested is Irina Chindea, who just received her PhD from Fletcher earlier this year.
If you're ever interested in taking this further, let me know.
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