Monday, September 19, 2011

Military networks in Greece

This is a controversial article questioning the potential of a military coup in Greece, published in September. The reason I chose to share it, is because in my point of view, it is actually describing the impact of specific social networks and aims to predict the possibility of a military coup in Greece based on the current political scene of the country, the role of the EU and the political shift in the Mediterranean region.

To begin with, the author identifies a rebellious trend spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East which was basically initiated by groups of people who share a common goal: to overthrow the political regimes they have been living under. Even though the ties between the respective social networks might not be direct, reciprocal or strong; social media served as a linking platform across countries and lead more people to join the networks and become involved in the protests wave.  All networks of such nature were activated by a similar cause and they were connected to one another via networking tools - social media. Even though these groups may not be directly connected or centrally governed, they form an overall-network of their own across countries.

On a second level, even though the current political situation in Greece is not an authoritarian regime, similarly rebellious social networks have been formed on a civilian level to pursue their inalienable rights before a corrupt democratic government. Thus the article journalist is questioning what would the outcome be, if the army actually took over power in Greece - a scenario which is not improbable in a theoretical framework, especially when taking into account the situation in the neighboring states. On this note, it is obvious that there is a connection pattern between the way networks function towards an objective and what might occur in similar situations. Such behavioral pattern could be possibly interpreted based on evidence provided by the relation between social networks analysis and historical facts.

Moreover, different social network groups are illustrated as interacting parties within and without the structure of the overall network of Greeks. These are for instance bureaucrats, politicians, military, people or the network of Germany and the EU. The author has experienced that the social network of bureaucrats would strike as a means to express their interests as they have recently done on a frequent basis. In regards to the Greek army, the author has no current events to refer to, other than the Junta back in the 70's. Consequently, historical evidence and regional behavior of military networks lead him to assume that a coup might not be so unlikely.


It would indeed be interesting to back this article up with a network analysis and prove whether the coup probability is a valid one or not. To do so, we would have to focus on the military network itself. An SNA would allow to identify who could be the potential leaders of a military coup within the Greek army and what are the connection ties between them. According to the density of the relationships it would be concluded whether this network would be strong enough to drive a coup.

To carry out this hypothetical task, it would be necessary to establish what are the attributes defining the people working for the Greek military. Those would be:

Military experience:
-Military unit
-Military rank
-Number of years in the position
-Number of years in the military
-Previous office - if in the military

Other work experience:
-Work experience before the military
-Government
-Public sector
-Private sector
-Number of years in the last position

Education:
-High school
-Some college
-College graduate
-Master degree
-Phd

Demographics:
-Gender
-Age
-Location
-Marital status
-Number of Children

Besides defining the group attributes, it would be essential to address the existing network connections:

Communication between unit leaders:
-Never communicated
-Occasionally communicated ( once a month )
-Frequently communicated ( once a week)
-Daily communication

Communication among and between units:
-Communicate only with people within my unit
-Communicate with people from one or two units
-Communicate with people from more than three units

Lastly, information about their political beliefs and perception to the government would be essential to establish the probability of a coup against the governement.

Political Beliefs:
-Liberal
-Democrat
-Socialist
-Indifferent

Government perception:
-Pro-government
-Anti-government
-Indifferent

Obviously some of this information (i.e political beliefs and government perception) would be hard to gather as people would be reluctant to share this kind of information. But If we assume that these data could be collected and analyzed, the following steps would take place:

1) Check the density of the relationship between unit leaders as well as their relationship ties with their own units. Establish the level of betweenness and closeness accordingly.
2) Analyze the profile of the unit leaders based on attributes and identify common areas such as political beliefs, ranking, years in the army, education level or their marital status.
3)  Establish who are the military officials with high ego networks and are well and strongly connected within and beyond their units. Those could be important players and could lead an initiative, despite the lack of high ranking position in the military hierarchy. 
4) Identify which are there strong ties or where there is no connection at all within a unit or between units. Spot which are the most connected units internally and which are the units who are most connected with another unit or more than one unit.

These data would assist the process of drawing valid conclusions. For example, the possibility of a coup would be limited if there were numerous organizational holes within or between units as it would not facilitate the circumstances for people to unite for one cause. As such if one unit decided to arbitrarily take over, there would be a higher chance that the other leaders would oppose. On the other hand if the connections where proven to be very strong and close, then the leaders would be more likely to consent and proceed together.

In addition, education and previous work experience according to the sector would assist in establishing whether these individuals have expanded networks that could be utilized differently. For instance, a military officer with a high eigenvector would be more likely to have had a similar network in a previously held position with a different organization, and thus the support network would be much greater.

Such an analysis could be further expanded and focus on the interacting networks beyond the military and the Greek borders. What if we could predict the future of the relationship between Greece and Germany or Greece and the EU based on social networks analysis? The EU, as depicted in the article, is a broad social network which links distinctive social networks which sometimes share different or even conflicting interests on the same matters. The interaction of these major social networks directly impact and influence the reaction of smaller networks respectively on each side. Social networks in a society - regardless of its broadness - are interdependent and must be perceived and analyzed as such in order to withdraw valid conclusions on the topic examined.  It is evident that social networks exist in every aspect of life and their analysis is indeed essential to understand today's international relations.

1 comment:

Christopher Tunnard said...

Nicely done, Yota. You have really thought it through. I like the idea of a "coup-prediction" network, as far-fetched as it may seem. And, ad you say, getting the personal data would be no easy task.