Interactions between Armed Actors in DR Congo’s restive East

Archibald S. Henry

SNO Part II – Blog entry

Overview

            Projected back into the African news headlines since 2016 with the delay of the presidential elections and the rise of a new insurgency in the Kasai region, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has a long history of violent conflict. Illicit natural resources exploitation and smuggling, institutionalized corruption, underdevelopment, ethnic marginalization and mobilization, and foreign involvement, have either aggravated conflict or extended it. The sheer size of the country, roughly equivalent to all of western and central Europe, has hindered good governance and rendered any stabilization attempts elusive. As a result, eastern Congo has experienced protracted conflict since the end of the 1990s, and dozens of armed groups operate and continue to proliferate in these vast stretches of instability. Several UN missions have been deployed to help secure the country, and the most recent version of it, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO), enjoys a mandate to use force beyond self-defense to neutralize armed groups and protect civilians. It represents today one of the UN’s largest and most expensive peace operation in the world. However, it has been criticized for its inability to contain the conflict, its passivity in the face of violence against civilians, acts of corruption, criminal complicity or sexual exploitation by some of its troops, its support to a deficient and corrupt national army, or double standards in tackling some armed groups but not others.[i] The new political crisis has coincided with a resumption of violence in the east, the (re-)emergence of armed groups, including local militias and foreign rebel movements (notably Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan), and new insurgencies in other parts of the country (Kasai and Katanga), creating more headaches for the international community, humanitarian actors, and especially the UN Mission.

Social Networks Analysis

A key marker of and variable in the Congolese conflict, thus, is the myriad of armed actors. These include Congolese insurgent groups, Congolese local defense militias (Mai-Mai), foreign rebel groups, the national army (FARDC)—with splinters and shifting alliances among generals—and MONUSCO. Given this context, social network analysis appears like a particularly useful tool to examine the emerging dynamics among armed actors in east and central Congo. The key question of this study will be: how do armed actors interact, with whom do they fight or cooperate, what are the main alliances and conflictual relationships, and, above all, who are the main players?

The massive investment of the United Nations in the country, with renewed questions about its role and usefulness, warrants a closer examination of its interactions with other armed players in the region. Expectations of a protracted political crisis and the probable rise of violence in much of the country only reinforce the need to better understand the patterns of conflict and cooperation as they stand now—is there an elephant in the room, an emerging armed group that is rarely mentioned or talked about? Are there armed actors that should be prioritized in UN combat operations given their influence and links to other actors? Do some actors reveal themselves as potentially useful in dialogue and/or disarmament efforts? Combined, these questions emphasize the relevance of social networks analysis in mapping out peace and conflict dynamics in the DRC, with the goal of informing local, regional and international efforts and players with a stake in peace and security in the country.

Methodology and Challenges

Data from the Congo Research Group (CRG) at the New York University Center for International Cooperation (NYU CIC), analysis from Judith Verweijen, ground work from civil society organizations and reporting from local journalists Ley Uwera and Esther Nsapu, and the mapping work of Christoph Vogel will be primary resources for identifying and connecting different armed actors—through two different types of ties: “combat,” or “cooperation.” In some cases, the interaction may be marked by both. If we chose to color ties such that “combat” is red, “cooperation” is blue, interactions exhibiting the two may be represented by purple. Moreover, armed actors will be represented as nodes and we will color these according to their general groupings:

National state actors, i.e. Congolese armed forces, police, intelligence service;

National non-state actors, i.e. Congolese insurgents and militias;

Foreign state actors, i.e. foreign national armies;

Foreign non-state actors, i.e. foreign rebels;

The UN mission, i.e. MONUSCO.

This project may involve the use of tie-strength to determine the level of “combat” or “cooperation” between groups, but the use of this feature remains to be determined: it is contingent upon a full review of the data given its potential complexity. In any case the study will tackle centrality measures to make better sense of the key players in the eastern DR Congo—their influence in the conflict and/or potential for influence. Other empirical tools that could be useful to accompany this project and advance the social network analysis include mapping, through GIS for instance.

As noted above, some armed actors are not homogenous and often exhibit splintering or internal conflict. These patterns also shift rapidly over time, leading to some unpredictability for analysis efforts. Even MONUSCO, despite the unitary character of its operations under the UN umbrella, exhibits some internal tensions (notably among troop contributing countries, as well as between contributors and the mission leadership), though these are never marked by actual combat. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that what may constitute “cooperation” or “conflict” with certain armed actors may be the result of the influence of some UN contributors (troops, donors…) and not necessarily reflective of the whole of the organization. Moreover, cooperation by some rogue elements of the national army with a local or foreign rebel group may not necessarily be imputable to the whole of the national army, though some data may suggest so. One strategy of this project will be to carefully examine and review all the data, disaggregate it, and decide whether to establish a tie or not in each case, whether “combat,” “cooperation,” or both.

Prior Social Network Analysis work on DR Congo or similar contexts

Ananda Viola, a development expert focusing on Africa’s Great Lakes region, has attempted a social networks visualization of different armed groups in eastern Congo.[ii] I have not seen any more recent work of hers, but her visualization shows it is quite possible to “map” the armed actors in eastern Congo and their interactions—with two different kinds of ties, battles (or conflict), and cooperation.

On Africa and conflict at large, many more such studies have been attempted, but one is striking for its comprehensiveness: El Hag Yousif’s study of humanitarian operations in Sudan in the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s during Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).[iii] Her work was central in mapping out interactions between armed and civilian players, whether local of international, in the Sudan civil war.

Hopefully this project on the DRC will enrich social network analysis literature on peace and security in Africa, strengthen knowledge on the country and regional dynamics,  and better inform strategies to tackle complex environments of protracted conflict at large.

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[i] Paul D. Williams and Solomon A. Dersso, “Saving Strangers and Neighbors: Advancing UN-AU Cooperation on Peace Operations,” New York: International Peace Institute, February 2015

[ii] Ananda Viola, “#NetworkAnalysis #RebelNetworks in Eastern #DRC 2012 Red Line: battles Blue line: cooperation,” Twitter, https://twitter.com/AnandaViola/status/870931403399200769, 3 June 2017

[iii] Salma D. El Hag Yousif, Understanding Emergency Relief Operations: Operation Lifeline Sudan and Beyond, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2011.