SITUATION
During the early morning of 5 October 2017, a large group of
armed men launched a coordinated attack on the three police stations within the
small port city of Mocimboa da Praia in Northern Mozambique effectively taking
control of the remote district capital for nearly two days. The men were part of an Islamic organization that
during their brief control of the city demanded the immediate implementation of
Sharia law in Northern Mozambique, warned all citizens to stop using any government
services (schools and hospitals), threatened any westerners and western
organizations in the area, and declared the authority of the federal government
nonexistent in the region. The
government soon retook the police stations and established authority in the
city but one year later the attacks continue[1].
Following the initial attack on Mociomboa da Praia, there
have been countless attacks throughout the Cabo Delgado province varying in
size, target, and intensity leaving hundreds dead and more displaced (see FIG
1.1 for June 2018 causality map). Militants often target government forces,
officials, and institutions to establish legitimacy but have also raided and pillaged
villages killing civilians for not adhering to their standards of Islam or for cooperation
with the government. Little is known
about the extremist group, Ansar al-Sharia, also called al-shabab and different
organizations and publications speculate about their connection to larger global
jihadist franchise networks, specifically al-shabab in Somalia[2]. Inversely government officials deny the link
to terror and state that the actions are simply those of criminal smugglers
attempting to regain freedom of maneuver through historic east/west smuggling
for their various enterprises[3]. The African Union even reported that the attacks
were the work of a new chapter of the Islamic State (IS).
To complicate matters many of the attacks are occurring less
than 10 miles from Pemba, the site of recently discovered expansive Liquid
Natural Gas (LNG) reserves that two US based multinational corporations are
developing through partnerships with the Government of Mozambique, projects
with multibillion-US Dollar price tags[4].
Many analysts have identified many
similarities to the current situation in the Cabo Delgado Province and in Maiduguri
in 2005 when Boko Haram began its rise to power[5]
.
QUESTIONS
(1)
Are the militants who are currently operating within
the Cabo Delgado province a standalone Jihadist Organization or are they part
of greater global jihadist franchise, i.e. ISIS or Al-Shabab and or influenced
by these larger organizations?
(2)
Are the individuals conducting violence in Northern
Mozambique not militant jihadists but rather members of a criminal organization
as theorized by government officials?
HYPOTHESIS
Ansar al-Sharia’s ability to sustain offensive operations over
a yearlong period throughout the Cabo Delgado province indicates that there is
a possible larger support network in place.
Furthermore, throughout this period Mozambican security forces have actively
targeted and engaged Ansar al-Sharia, denying them access to areas of material
and personnel support, further indicating external assistance.
Two different external networks of actors support and influence
Ansar al-Sharia, regional trafficking organizations provide material support and
extremist groups in the Horn of Africa provide influence the actions and
underlying violent principles.
METHODOLOGY
To test the abovementioned hypothesis and research questions
I will utilize Social Network Analysis (SNA) to identify the overall Ansar
al-Sharia network operating in northern Mozambique as well as subsets of active
Eastern African Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) and Transnational
Criminal Organizations (TCO). Within the Ansar al-Sharia network focus will
be on identifying key nodes or individuals that serve as facilitators of information,
influence, or resources; the centrality measure of betweenness, eigenvector, and closeness
will be a key analytical functions in identifying these individuals. Measures
of homophily will be applied to all
traits of actors within the Ansar al-Sharia network understand subgroupings
that form within the organization’s network.
VEOs or TCOs mentioned in reporting of violence in northern
Mozambique will be added to the overall network to measure the potential
influence and support of external regional and global networks. SNA emphasis
will be on identifying bridges and cut points between these networks as
well as measuring their strength and credibility. These ties and connections are critical to
answering the overall research questions but can only be analyzed and
potentially identified once the Ansar al-Sharia network has been mapped. In
addition to the above mentioned unimodal network(s), I will create a multimodal
network of attack location and individual actor participation to further
identify geographic or tactical patterns within Ansar al-Sharia’s operations in
Northern Mozambique.
DATA
All data sources will be assigned a numerical score for credibility/correctness(C/C)
on a scale of 1 to 3 due to the historically inaccurate and biased reporting
that has come from certain Eastern African news sources. Data C/C scores will allow additional
analysis at various levels of certainty to show definitive and speculative links
and relationships. Primary sources of
data for this project will be:
(1) Open source news reporting, both international and
regional sources to include both print and online mediums
(2) Twitter and other available social media postings by
individuals and organizations detailing the ongoing violence in northern Mozambique,
as well as any statements over social media made by the militants
(3) Development and
project data form Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations
(IGOs) that are currently working in and round the Cabo Delgado province
(4) Reports and Analysis conducted by Defense, Security,
Extremism, Intelligence and other online organizations such as STRATFOR, African S and
Global Risk .
(5) Press releases by Exxon Mobil, Anadarko, Eni, and other
multinational corporations currently or planning on establishing LNG operations
in and around Pemba
(6) US Department of State travel advisory warnings and
press releases
CHALLENGES
Northern Mozambique is vast, rural and underdeveloped severely
reducing the capacity of modern mass media to provide regular updates and
reports and most residents rely on local newspapers, small band radio, and word
of mouth as their primary new source. Additionally the region is linguistically
diverse with three major languages Portuguese, Kiwanee, and Swahili spoken in
various villages and communities along with various lesser-used local dialects. The violence and situation in Cabo Delgado
has been underreported in the western news media, with only a few sources in
South Africa and Portugal providing any semblance of in-depth coverage. See FIG 1.2 for a comparison of Google News searches
for Mocimboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado Province, and Boko Haram; an active VEO in
Western Africa who’s genesis has drawn comparisons to recent events in Cabo Delgado. This lack of western reporting has led to a
lack of sources and knowledge of the situation. Finally, Mozambique ranks 99
out of 180 countries on the Press Freedom Index, earning a Noticeable Problems rating, potentially
limiting the ability of journalists to accurately report and publish stories about
the ongoing insurrection[6].
FIG 1.1
FIG 1.2
Bibliography:
Issufo, Nadia. Mocímboa da Praia: problem with
controlled attacks? September 5, 2018.
https://www.dw.com/pt-002/moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia-problema-com-ataques-controlado/a-43724524
(accessed October 18, 2018).
Pirio, Gregory, Robert Pittelli, and Yussuf Adam. The
Emergence of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique. March 25, 2018.
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-emergence-of-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/
(accessed October 16, 2018).
Reporters Without Borders . 2018 World Press
Freedom Index. 2018. https://rsf.org/en/ranking (accessed October 16,
2018).
Vukmanovic. Exxon beefs up Mozambique LNG project
to cut costs ahead of bank talks. June 2018, 2018.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-mozambique-lng/exxon-beefs-up-mozambique-lng-project-to-cut-costs-ahead-of-bank-talks-idUSKBN1K22PG
(accessed October 19, 2018).
West, Sunguta. Ansar al-Sunna: A New Militant
Islamist Group Emerges in Mozambique. June 14, 2018.
https://jamestown.org/program/ansar-al-sunna-a-new-militant-islamist-group-emerges-in-mozambique/
(accessed October 17, 2018).
1 comment:
Good start, with a clear overall Q, making it obvious that SNA is the right technique to use to uncover the domestic and international support networks for the Cabo Delgado militants. Adequate description of the SNA techniques; they will become clearer once your data is in place, and it's assembling that data that will be your biggest challenge.There's a large potential amount from diverse sources. This is where using the kind of tools you have available to you (and that you demoed for us in class) will be invaluable. I look forward to seeing this develop.
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