SNA Proposal: Youth Networks in Tehran, Iran

Proposal by: Mirza Ramic (will not be taking the second-half module, unfortunately)

Date: Oct. 24, 2013

Research Question:

Is social media helping shape networks among youth in Tehran, Iran that are based on shared interests derived from non-Iranian popular culture and entertainment preferences, at the potential expense of domestic political and civic engagement?

Background and Objective:

I have personally been in contact with numerous young people (ages ~18-30) from Tehran via social media, with whom I share similar music interests but who do not seem to be very politically active or at the very least politically vocal.  This could be either because A) they fear government officials might be monitoring their social media activities so they keep their political opinions offline, or B) they have focused their attention to non-Iranian popular culture and entertainment through social media, potentially at the expense of local political and civic engagement.  It seems plausible that the popular culture and entertainment value of social media could be strong enough that they are willing to accept point A, but then risk shifting further toward point B.  Of course, it could be the case that the majority of youth in Tehran was never very politically engaged to begin with, even before the dissemination of social media.  Still, the point here is to see whether the majority of youth that have formed networks around their interests derived from outward-looking social media use is disengaged from political and socioeconomic issues at home today, the implication being that they are now not only passive but also distracted.  (Alternatively, this could be a good thing a la 1970s English political punk music movement—if these non-political networks in Tehran were somehow eventually mobilized into political and social action—and for such a scenario this analysis could also be useful.)

For example, there is now a growing underground electronic music scene in Tehran and many young people are embracing Western electronic musicians, as well as beginning to create their own music in this genre. (For my own electronic music group, which now has nearly 10,000 “Likes” on Facebook, Tehran ranks as the second city in the world with most contributing “Likes” according to Facebook Page Insights.)  This engagement stemming from social media use= might then prevail over—or shift the focus away from—local political and civic engagement.  I would want to explore, if it was possible to conduct surveys on the ground in Tehran, how true this proposition might be and whether social networks among youth are being formed based on shared interests (such as music preferences, especially those derived from the West) rather than political and social domestic issues.

Hypothesis:

Youth in Tehran, Iran who use social media more frequently are less likely to engage in domestic political and civic issues as their focus shifts to exploring non-Iranian popular culture, entertainment, and media.  They form new social networks based on this shifting focus, and become less engaged in domestic political and civic issues since the basis of their networks is no longer centered around local and domestic matters.

Methodological Approach and Analysis:

Ideally, I would conduct a physical (offline) survey in Tehran, Iran (this, of course, is nearly impossible).  In this survey, in addition to the questions below, I would especially focus on finding out whether young adults who do not use social media frequently are connected according to more local issues and whether their political and civic engagement is higher.  However, I could start with an online survey of the individuals that have “Liked” my electronic music group’s Facebook page (241 individuals, presumably the majority of whom is under the age of 30).  I would analyze their network based on the following attribute information acquired from the survey:

1) Age

2) Occupational status (student, worker, unemployed, other)

3) Economic status

4) Hours per day spent on social media

5) Main purpose of using social media and hours spent on each category (I would include more details about each category):

-       Entertainment: domestic vs. foreign

-       Non-entertainment news and politics: domestic vs. foreign

-       Communication: personal, professional, community engagement; domestic vs. foreign

-       Other

6) Do you interact with your social media/online “friends” offline? If so: frequently, occasionally, rarely?

7) Hours per day spent on non-social media activities:

-       Studies/work

-       Offline entertainment

-       Offline hobbies

-       Offline communication: personal, professional, community engagement

8) Your top three interests/hobbies

9)  Some type of a question about political discourse, engagement, and activity, but not sure if this would be feasible, i.e., if answers would be accurate due to fears of government surveillance.  For example, I would want to ask: How many times per week do you engage in a dialogue about domestic political and socioeconomic issues?

 

(These questions would have to be carefully fleshed out to account for the sensitivity of conducting an online survey with Iranian nationals.)

With data collected if I was able to conduct an offline survey in Tehran, I would compare frequent social media users to others in their age category who are infrequent social media users, and see if the level of offline communication (and especially community engagement communication, which I would have to define more specifically) and political/socioeconomic engagement varies significantly across the two groups.  The idea would be to map out networks based on social media use, including: foreign vs. domestic social media use (i.e. using social media as a channel to access foreign vs. domestic information), frequent vs. non-frequent social media use, and entertainment vs. other (especially community engagement) social media use.  There are a lot of possible networks that could come out of this, but I would want to look at the network density and strength of ties for the “distracted” social media youth who are less politically engaged vs. the less “distracted” non-social media youth who are more politically vocal.  Then, I would also want to compare the former with the youth who are frequent social media users but are also more politically active.  Ultimately, this social network analysis would hopefully illustrate how young people in Tehran, Iran who use social media form networks, and whether ties based on the common interest of non-Iranian popular culture, entertainment, and media have a role to play in determining the level of domestic political and socioeconomic engagement as well as offline communication.

Potential Problems:

Well, getting to Tehran, Iran – but I might be able to pull that off…