Formulating counter-terrorism strategies for Pakistan using Social Network Analysis

Counter-terrorism strategies for Pakistan: Can Social Network Analysis identify targets for different strategies?

Arqam Lodhi for Social Networks in Organization Module-I. Unable to pursue this SNA proposal in Module-II.

Abstract: Different terrorist outfits and affiliates of Al-Qaeda network operating in Pakistan have wrecked havoc over the last decade, resulting in casualties of more than 25,000 civilians and security personnel since 2003. The newly elected government has been formulating a new comprehensive strategy, using a multi-pronged approach to deal with such outfits. Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be extremely valuable in identifying and isolating different outfits for targeted ‘treatment’, using all possible tools such as legislative reforms, negotiations and military operations. In this post, I have attempted to explore if SNA, done at both outfit and individual levels, can be used as a basis of counter-terrorism strategy. In the absence of a precise and customized approach, any strategy is unlikely to fully achieve its objectives.

Background:

Outfits’ Profile: According to some experts, it is hard to exactly determine how many unique outfits are operating in Pakistan. However, they can be categorized based on their declared objectives, as done by Ashley J Tellis of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in a testimony before U.S. House Foreign Affairs subcommittee. These categories are: (1) Sectarian, (2) Anti-Indian, (3) Afghan Taliban, (4) Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and (5) Pakistani Taliban. In addition to these, there are several other outfits such as Punjabi Taliban, separatist insurgent groups in Baluchistan province and some tribal elements in North Western Pakistan who either operate independently or in collusion with groups above in reaction to the changed demographic and political realities resulting from reduced autonomy after military operations on both sides of Pakistan-Afghanistan border. As of September 2013, Government of Pakistan listed and banned 52 organizations that are involved in terrorist activities.

Modus Operandi: Two elements are crucial for these outfits of any category: (1) money, and (2) manpower. In addition to these two, operational and logistical cooperation and ideology-based alliances connect these outfits. With funding sources from Middle Eastern diaspora and states drying up, most of these outfits also depend on an array of criminal activities such as drug trade, extortion, kidnapping, smuggling, money and trade laundering and looting.

Counter-terrorism strategy: The proposed counter-terrorism strategy should aim at dismantling the operational structure of these outfits, leaving them completely crippled rather than hoping to eliminate them entirely. The three potential approaches could be: (1) dismantling the financial resources pipeline and operational support structure, (2) negotiating with reconcilable elements, (3) targeted surgical strikes against outfits determined to be consistently operating on their agenda.

Social Network Analysis:

Objectives: SNA should be conducted at two levels, (1) organizational/outfit level, and (2) individual actor level. The key objective of SNA is to visualize how and what outfits are connected with each other; exploring the key determinants of these connections based on the attributes of these outfits and actors. A 2-mode analysis combining frequency of their interaction, based on the number of joint operations or communication, and their attributes would help us narrow down those outfits that have the strongest ties, i.e. connected by attributes, operational and financial cooperation and ideological position. Sub-group analysis should help us identify those factions within the network that might stand out in either extremes, willing or unwilling for negotiations. Evidence of dissent within militant outfits already exists and faction analysis would help us identify such outfits.

Key Research Question: Through network analysis, can we identify nodes and sub-groups within networks that can be targeted by three counterterrorism approaches stated above, based on their network position and attributes?

Network measures of interest: In Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, Valdis Krebs has identified three important network centrality measures to analyze these networks: (1) degreesàlevel of activity of a node within a network, (2) closenessàability to access others in the network, and (3) betweenessàability of a node to act as a broker, i.e. to control flow of information or resources between nodes.

Data: Following variables would be important to conduct this SNA. This is not an exhaustive list:

•  Total # of outfits (including same core/structure-multiple names)
• Level of interaction between outfits (communication, operational planning and execution, financial collaboration)
• Attributes:
•  Category 1 to 7 of outfit, listed above
•  Level of activism, determined by level of operational involvement/# of attacks
•  Attitude towards negotiation (state-led or mediated)
•  Ideological drivers: (political, religious, sectarian, ethnic, money or a combination)
•  Operational strength: (nature of attacks, # of members, weapons)
• Financial health

Limitations: Krebs describes three limitations to application of SNA to terrorist networks: (1) Incompleteness: difficulty to state with certainty that all actors have been accounted for in the network, (2) Fuzzy boundaries: challenge in deciding which actors to include in which category, and (3) Dynamic: these networks are always changing. Also, absence of ties or distance between nodes might not mean absence of connection or limited interaction; this might be done deliberately and strategically to deceive law enforcement agencies. Finally, data is very confidential and access to it is most likely restricted to officials in the security establishment.