David Park
Unfortunately will not be joining the 2nd module
North Korea has baffled not only the U.S. but also other
countries. At times, negotiation seems
to work and other times, it does not seem to work at all. Force has been ruled out given the
devastating humanitarian and economic consequences, not just to South
Korea, but also to the region. Experts
both in and outside of government have pondered and attempted many different
methods, to include sanctions, multi-national talks (six-party talks),
deterrence, and isolation.
One of the methods used by the U.S. is isolation, rallying
allies and like-minded countries to present a unified stance against North
Korea. In implementing this plan, the
U.S. has looked to the Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Vietnam,
and Burma that have had and still have friendly ties with North Korea, but are also
open to interaction and cooperation with Western countries. Certain Southeast Asian countries have been
looked at by the U.S. because of the similarities in ideology, historical
background, and governance with North Korea.
The assumption is that if Southeast Asian countries would minimize (or
even better- curtail) their relationship with North Korea, it would help
advance the international community’s efforts to isolate North Korea and persuade
it to comply with its international agreements.
To begin, I would define my network boundary by focusing on only
those Southeast Asian countries that have diplomatic relations with North
Korea. To gather this information, I can
do a Google search and find out which countries have diplomatic relations with
North Korea. Next comes the real
challenge, which, if the answer can be found would be extremely useful, is
whether or not those Southeast Asian countries with ties to North Korea also have
active ties among themselves, exchanging North Korean goods in Southeast
Asia? Thereby, they would have their own
network (with the inclusion of North Korea).
Because if there is evidence of a network, then the U.S. can implement a
different strategy, one that breaks or disrupts this network and indirectly isolate
North Korea. With this information, the
U.S. and the international community will also be able to tell the extent of
ties Southeast Asia has with North Korea and how wide North Korean goods are
propagated.
It will be difficult acquiring the information that reveals
this, assuming it already exists, because most likely this will be
classified. And this kind of information
is not something a Southeast Asian country would (or could) readily share with
the U.S. for a variety of reasons specific to that Southeast Asian
country. But assuming that one has
access to such information and it exists, things to look for would be:
1) Are there
bidirectional ties and do they run through all the relevant Southeast Asian
countries (aka- network)?
2) Are there
unidirectional ties from a Southeast Asian country to North Korea? (Unidirectional
ties from North Korea are not expected since whatever it has to give, it’ll first
ask for something in return given its failed economy and past patterns of
behavior.)
3) What is the
betweenness centrality of the Southeast Asian countries?
4) What is the
closeness centrality of the Southeast Asian countries?
5) What is the
strength of the ties for certain goods?
The way to determine the existence of ties is to see if
goods are traded (bidirectional tie) between North Korea and a Southeast Asian
country or given (unidirectional) by a Southeast Asian country to North
Korea. Therefore, for the purpose of
this project, I would categorize that as an interaction, which also qualifies as a tie.
Figuring out the existence of bidirectional ties that run
through the relevant Southeast Asian countries will give credence to the
existence and practice of a network among the Southeast Asian countries and
North Korea. It can shed light on what those
goods are that North Korea and the Southeast Asian countries trade. If certain illegal goods are being exchanged
within this network, those countries can then be asked to explain why or even
be held accountable for distributing illegal goods.
The second question will reveal who is giving to North
Korea. This will allow the U.S. and the
international community to directly approach a particular Southeast Asian country
regarding its giving to North Korea. In
the process, one might be able to find out what specific good is being sent to
NK. Knowing this helps the U.S. and the
international community to directly address a Southeast Asian country’s giving
and persuades it to stop doing so.
Knowing betweenness will be valuable as it will reveal if
there are any countries in Southeast Asia that is acting as a bridge between
North Korea and another Southeast Asian country or between two or more
Southeast Asian countries. If there is a
particular Southeast Asian country that is in fact acting as a bridge, then the
U.S. and the international community can focus on breaking that tie. In this way the network (if one does exist)
can be disrupted.
Closeness will come in handy because it will show which
country, if any, North Korea relies on to distribute its goods. One can also view it as which of the Southeast
Asian countries best reaches out to other Southeast Asian countries without
(many) intermediaries. The one with the
most closeness centrality will likely be the one North Korea relies on to
mobilize the network. This information can be useful in knowing
which Southeast Asian country the U.S. and the international community could
focus on to persuade it away from helping to perpetuate North Korea’s bad
behavior and to break or disrupt the network from operating smoothly [meaning
the other Southeast Asian countries will have to go through (more)
intermediaries since they won’t have the Southeast Asian country with the most
closeness centrality.]
Strength of the ties is also valuable information to obtain
because it will reveal on what issues certain Southeast Asian countries have strong
ties to North Korea, evidence that can be used to dispute statements from a
Southeast Asian country that its interaction on a certain issue is
limited. But it can also be determined
on what goods North Korea in particular is concerned about acquiring based on
the strength of the ties. Then the U.S.
and the international community can pursue sanctions or a specific avenue that
would prevent countries from exchanging the goods North Korea desires, which
would aid in isolating it.
By no means is this the answer to solving the North Korea
problem. Rather, it’s an attempt at
better understanding, through social network analysis, how it manages to
subsist and in seeing how the U.S. and the international community can more
effectively pursue the strategy of isolation, especially given the sparseness
of information on North Korea, and perhaps get one step closer to solving the
problem that is North Korea.
1 comment:
This is high on my list of "wouldn't it be nice?" SNAs. Nicely developed. Good understanding of SNA measures. As usual in these cases, it's all about the availability of data.
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