Wednesday, October 24, 2012

Proposed SNA: Better Isolating North Korea through a SNA of North Korea's International Network of Friends



David Park
Unfortunately will not be joining the 2nd module

North Korea has baffled not only the U.S. but also other countries.   At times, negotiation seems to work and other times, it does not seem to work at all.  Force has been ruled out given the devastating humanitarian and economic consequences, not just to South Korea, but also to the region.  Experts both in and outside of government have pondered and attempted many different methods, to include sanctions, multi-national talks (six-party talks), deterrence, and isolation.   

One of the methods used by the U.S. is isolation, rallying allies and like-minded countries to present a unified stance against North Korea.  In implementing this plan, the U.S. has looked to the Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Vietnam, and Burma that have had and still have friendly ties with North Korea, but are also open to interaction and cooperation with Western countries.  Certain Southeast Asian countries have been looked at by the U.S. because of the similarities in ideology, historical background, and governance with North Korea.  The assumption is that if Southeast Asian countries would minimize (or even better- curtail) their relationship with North Korea, it would help advance the international community’s efforts to isolate North Korea and persuade it to comply with its international agreements.  

To begin, I would define my network boundary by focusing on only those Southeast Asian countries that have diplomatic relations with North Korea.  To gather this information, I can do a Google search and find out which countries have diplomatic relations with North Korea.  Next comes the real challenge, which, if the answer can be found would be extremely useful, is whether or not those Southeast Asian countries with ties to North Korea also have active ties among themselves, exchanging North Korean goods in Southeast Asia?  Thereby, they would have their own network (with the inclusion of North Korea).  Because if there is evidence of a network, then the U.S. can implement a different strategy, one that breaks or disrupts this network and indirectly isolate North Korea.  With this information, the U.S. and the international community will also be able to tell the extent of ties Southeast Asia has with North Korea and how wide North Korean goods are propagated.  

It will be difficult acquiring the information that reveals this, assuming it already exists, because most likely this will be classified.  And this kind of information is not something a Southeast Asian country would (or could) readily share with the U.S. for a variety of reasons specific to that Southeast Asian country.  But assuming that one has access to such information and it exists, things to look for would be:

1)  Are there bidirectional ties and do they run through all the relevant Southeast Asian countries (aka- network)? 

2)  Are there unidirectional ties from a Southeast Asian country to North Korea? (Unidirectional ties from North Korea are not expected since whatever it has to give, it’ll first ask for something in return given its failed economy and past patterns of behavior.)

3)  What is the betweenness centrality of the Southeast Asian countries?

4)  What is the closeness centrality of the Southeast Asian countries?

5)  What is the strength of the ties for certain goods?

The way to determine the existence of ties is to see if goods are traded (bidirectional tie) between North Korea and a Southeast Asian country or given (unidirectional) by a Southeast Asian country to North Korea.  Therefore, for the purpose of this project, I would categorize that as an interaction, which also qualifies as a tie.

Figuring out the existence of bidirectional ties that run through the relevant Southeast Asian countries will give credence to the existence and practice of a network among the Southeast Asian countries and North Korea.  It can shed light on what those goods are that North Korea and the Southeast Asian countries trade.  If certain illegal goods are being exchanged within this network, those countries can then be asked to explain why or even be held accountable for distributing illegal goods.  

The second question will reveal who is giving to North Korea.  This will allow the U.S. and the international community to directly approach a particular Southeast Asian country regarding its giving to North Korea.  In the process, one might be able to find out what specific good is being sent to NK.  Knowing this helps the U.S. and the international community to directly address a Southeast Asian country’s giving and persuades it to stop doing so.

Knowing betweenness will be valuable as it will reveal if there are any countries in Southeast Asia that is acting as a bridge between North Korea and another Southeast Asian country or between two or more Southeast Asian countries.  If there is a particular Southeast Asian country that is in fact acting as a bridge, then the U.S. and the international community can focus on breaking that tie.  In this way the network (if one does exist) can be disrupted.  

Closeness will come in handy because it will show which country, if any, North Korea relies on to distribute its goods.  One can also view it as which of the Southeast Asian countries best reaches out to other Southeast Asian countries without (many) intermediaries.  The one with the most closeness centrality will likely be the one North Korea relies on to mobilize the network.   This information can be useful in knowing which Southeast Asian country the U.S. and the international community could focus on to persuade it away from helping to perpetuate North Korea’s bad behavior and to break or disrupt the network from operating smoothly [meaning the other Southeast Asian countries will have to go through (more) intermediaries since they won’t have the Southeast Asian country with the most closeness centrality.] 

Strength of the ties is also valuable information to obtain because it will reveal on what issues certain Southeast Asian countries have strong ties to North Korea, evidence that can be used to dispute statements from a Southeast Asian country that its interaction on a certain issue is limited.  But it can also be determined on what goods North Korea in particular is concerned about acquiring based on the strength of the ties.  Then the U.S. and the international community can pursue sanctions or a specific avenue that would prevent countries from exchanging the goods North Korea desires, which would aid in isolating it.  

By no means is this the answer to solving the North Korea problem.  Rather, it’s an attempt at better understanding, through social network analysis, how it manages to subsist and in seeing how the U.S. and the international community can more effectively pursue the strategy of isolation, especially given the sparseness of information on North Korea, and perhaps get one step closer to solving the problem that is North Korea. 

1 comment:

Christopher Tunnard said...

This is high on my list of "wouldn't it be nice?" SNAs. Nicely developed. Good understanding of SNA measures. As usual in these cases, it's all about the availability of data.