Wednesday, October 24, 2012

SNA Proposal: Governments and Factions in the Somali Conflict



Elly Teitsworth
Proposed SNA project to carry out in 2nd module

Overview:
Over more than two decades without an effective central government, a large number of factions have competed for power in Somalia.  These groups have sometimes formed alliances with each other and occasionally merged to form new groups.  In other cases factions have fought with one another, or one group has fractured into two or more conflicting offshoots.  Global powers and other states in the region have sometimes backed very different factions at different points in time.  The large number of actors and the shifting web of relationships between them have made the conflict in Somalia infamously complex.

Objective:
This SNA project proposes to map out the network of factions in Somalia, self-proclaimed autonomous regions and states within Somalia, and foreign powers that have had a cooperative or antagonistic relationship with one or more of these groups.  As the groups involved in the conflict have changed over the decades, the aim will be to compare the relationships from consecutive periods of time and to analyze any trends that may have shifted over these time frames.

Research question:
Have the attributes associated with positive relationships (cooperation) or with negative relationships (conflict) changed over the course of the Somali conflict?  For example, do cooperation and conflict now tend to be based more often (or less often) on clan affiliation, geographical location, political affiliation, religious beliefs, or other factors than they were most often associated with previously?

SNA structure:
A survey is not needed for this project; data is available in written sources (see the preliminary bibliography).  The nodes in this analysis will be factions and governments.  The ties will be bidirectional and either positive or negative to represent cooperative or antagonistic relationships.  The attributes will include the clan affiliation (or none), religious affiliation (or none), political orientation, geographic area of activity, years during which the group was active, and any additional relevant characteristics identified as the research progresses.  The analysis will focus on homophily measures and the correlation between the attributes of two nodes and the existence of a positive or negative relationship between them.

Potential Issues:
The selection of a method for analyzing the network over different time frames will need to be considered carefully.  One option is to make three binary attributes that indicate whether or not the group or government was actively involved before the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, between 1991 and the UN interventions in 1995, and after 1995.  The option on the other end of the spectrum is to create an attribute for each year going back to the 1970s which indicates whether or not the group was involved during that year.  This would allow for a much detailed look at the network over time, as many changes may have occurred within the three major time period mentioned above.  However, this approach could be difficult to implement and may complicate the analysis.  In between these two methods lies an obvious third option of grouping the years into more than three time frames.  This choice will be made with the aim of finding a method that is most relevant to the analysis and is neither too simplistic nor overly complex.

A second problem may lie in the data collection.  Although information about many of these factions is detailed and easily located, it can prove difficult to find specific information about some factions that have played lesser roles.  This may cause two potential setbacks.  First, some of the attribute data may be missing for smaller, less influential groups.  More importantly, their ties to other factions may be difficult to confirm.  Second, while the overall network should contain sufficient nodes for a useful analysis even in light of this potential problem, this may not be true when the network is examined during a specific time frame.  If information on some factions is not possible to collect, and all factions that were not active during a specific time period are removed, the number of actors may be reduced to a level that is not useful for analysis.  Preliminary research suggests that if this does become an issue, the number of nodes should still be at least around 20, and ideally more in the range of 30 (see preliminary list below).  Care will be taken include details for as many relevant groups as feasible, though conclusions may weaker than hoped if the number of nodes included in a particular time frame is lower than ideal.

Preliminary list of nodes

1.      Somali Salvation Democratic Front
2.      Somali National Front
3.      Somali National Movement
4.      Somali Patriot Movement
5.      United Somali Congress
6.      Somali Democratic Movement
7.      Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya
8.      United Somali Root
9.      Republic of Somaliland
10.  Somali National Alliance
11.  Somali Democratic Alliance
12.  United Somali Front
13.  Somali African Muke Organization
14.  Somali National Democratic Union
15.  Somali National Union
16.  United Somali Party
17.  Puntland State of Somalia
18.  Jubaland (under Juba Valley Alliance)
19.  Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
20.  Southwestern State of Somalia
21.  Rahanweyn Resistance Army
22.  Transitional Federal Government
23.  Islamic Courts Union
24.  Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
25.  Autonomous region of Galmudug
26.  Popular resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations
27.  Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
28.  Maakhir State of Somalia
29.  Hizbul Islam
30.  Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a
31.  Al Shabaab
32.  Al Qaeda
33.  African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
34.  Ethiopia
35.  Kenya
36.  Eritrea
37.  Djibouti
38.  Uganda
39.  Soviet Union/Russia
40.  United States

Preliminary Bibliography

Axelrod, R. M. (1997). The complexity of cooperation: Agent-based models of
competition and collaboration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Compagnon, Daniel. "The Somali Opposition Fronts," Horn of Africa, 13, Nos. 1-2,          
January-June 1990, 29-54.

Dougherty, James E. The Horn of Africa: A Map of Political- Strategic Conflict.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982.

Elmi, A. A. (2010). Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Islam, and
Peacebuilding. Pluto Press.

Gilkes, Patrick. "Somalia: Conflicts Within and Against the Military Regime," Review of  
African Political Economy [Sheffield, United Kingdom], No. 44, 1989, 53-58.

Gryc, W.  Intergroup conflict: A social network approach. Initiative for Interdisciplinary  
Research.

Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2006). Power positions: International
organizations, social networks, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50, 3.

Hammarström, M.; heldt, B. (2002). The diffusion of military intervention: Testing a
network position approach. International interactions, 28, 355-377.

Teo, T. K., & Croco, S. (2005). Assessing the dyadic approach to interstate conflict
processes: A.k.a. “Dangerous” dyad-years. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22, 5-18.

1 comment:

Christopher Tunnard said...

You already know what I think about this. If the data "cooperates" it will be hugely interesting. Excellent that you specified where the problems may lie. Looking forward!